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This study investigates how the spread of technological know-how and nuclear 
technology resulted in the emergence of new threats to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT). Currently, the world has to deal with the perils of latent proliferation, in 
which a country adheres to the NPT while nevertheless developing the capabilities 
needed for a nuclear weapons program.  
The first chapter argues that nuclear cooperation under the auspices of the NPT 
resulted in the emergence of virtual nuclear powers (VNPs) - countries that are able to 
develop nuclear weapons but stop before assembling them. This study concludes that in 
reaction to the emergence of VNPs, nuclear weapon states (NWS) are not only imposing 
harsh conditions on the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to nonnuclear weapon 
states (NNWS), but also prioritizing the non-proliferation pillar of the agreement, 
undermining the grand bargain that sustains the treaty.  
The second chapter investigates whether the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine 
poses a growing risk to the nonproliferation regime. The lack of regulation concerning 
naval propulsion reactors (NPRs) might work as a good excuse for a country that is 
willing to produce weapons grade uranium and resume its nuclear weapons program. 
After all, Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) designated for NPRs are exempt from the 
IAEA safeguards. The case study based on open sources concludes, however, that 
domestic and international legal constraints impede the development of a nuclear 
weapons program in Brazil. 
 iii 
The last chapter of the paper looks into the effectiveness of United Nations 
sanctions on nuclear proliferant states involved in illicit nuclear trade. Investigating North 
Korea and Iran, this study tests the hypothesis that sanctions might slow down the 
development of nuclear programs but do not prevent the engagement of states in illicit 
nuclear trade because the spread of technological know-how and manufacturing 
capabilities in the past decades had a major impact on the nuclear weapons and missile 
programs of several developing countries. The research concludes that they are able to 
support one another directly at the state-to-state level or indirectly through private sector 
supply networks. Illicit trade is also facilitated by lax export controls and uneven 
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The three chapters of my thesis look into how the spread of nuclear technology 
jeopardizes the nonproliferation regime. The general argument is that peaceful nuclear 
cooperation resulted in latent proliferation and the creation of a new category of countries 
that control the full nuclear cycle and engage in activities that defy the nonproliferation 
regime, such as nuclear-powered submarine programs and illicit nuclear trade.  
It is undeniable that peaceful nuclear cooperation allowed the improvement of the 
lives of millions that now have access to electricity generated by power plants and the 
advantages of naval nuclear propulsion systems. The downside is that more countries are 
now able to accumulate highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium as a byproduct of 
the generation of nuclear electricity. In addition, currently there are more rogue actors 
engaged in illicit nuclear trade, providing nuclear material and technology in the black 
market, which is also undermining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) and the sanctions regime. 
In general, the methodology involved the research of three different topics: the 
emergence of the so-called virtual nuclear powers (VNPs), countries that only depend on 
a political decision in order to go nuclear and are a direct consequence of peaceful 
nuclear cooperation under the NPT
1
; the development of nuclear-powered submarine 
programs, which might result in the increase of HEU and plutonium in the world; the 
development of proliferation of networks in developing countries that are engaged in 
illicit nuclear trade and are able to bypass export controls, sanctions and the whole 
nonproliferation regime. 
                                                        
1 “Virtual Nuclear Powers a Looming Threat, ElBaradei Warns,” The Guardian, May 2009. 
 2 
In the first chapter, I argue that nuclear cooperation under the NPT resulted in the 
emergence of VNPs - countries that are able to develop nuclear weapons but stop before 
assembling them. According to former IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei " (...) 
this phenomenon goes much beyond Iran. Pretty soon ... you will have nine weapons 
states and probably another 10 or 20 virtual weapons states
2
." Then, I proceed to 
investigate whether the emergence of VNPs is closely related to the spread of nuclear 
technology and pose a threat to the NPT. 
In this sense, I rely on a research conducted by Matthew Fuhrman, who 
establishes a direct relationship between what he calls peaceful nuclear cooperation and 
nuclear weapons proliferation. He analyzed 2,000 Nuclear Cooperation Agreements 
signed from 1945 to 2000 and concluded that nuclear aid increases the likelihood of 
acquiring the bomb by about 360 percent; the combination of atomic assistance and 
militarized conflicts increases the probability of building nuclear weapons by 750 
percent
3
. However, this relationship is probabilistic not deterministic, simply because not 
all recipients of assistance will cross the nuclear threshold
4
. 
The research methodology attempts to demonstrate how nuclear cooperation 
resulted in the development of nuclear programs in Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and even 
Syria. I also analyzed the North Korean program in a case study. After all, the North 
Korean case demonstrates how the signing of a peaceful cooperation agreement with the 
Soviets in 1959 ended up in the acquisition of the bomb a few decades later. It is also 
                                                        
2 Virtual Nuclear Powers a Looming Threat, ElBaradei Warns, The Guardian, May 2009. 
3 Matthew Furhmann, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and the Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreements,” International Security, 2009, pp. 39-41. 
4 Sonali Singh and Christopher R Way. “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2004. 
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important to highlight the fact that the country was the first nonnuclear weapon state to 
withdraw from the NPT. I conclude that nuclear assistance really gives rise to VNPs, 
undermining one of the most important pillars of the nonproliferation regime. After all, 
“none of today`s nine nuclear weapons states achieved their status without the assistance 




In the second chapter, I look into the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine 
program and how the lack of regulation concerning naval propulsion reactors (NPRs) 
might work as a good excuse for a country that is willing to produce weapons grade 
uranium and resume its nuclear weapons program. After all, the NPT does not regulate 
the production, use and disposal of Highly Enriched Uranium for naval nuclear reactors, 
which means that submarines are not subject to the safeguards regime. Moreover, the 
same technology that makes fuel for nuclear reactors can also produce explosive material 
for nuclear bombs – the dual-use technology dilemma.  
The Brazilian precedent would make it easier for other states that may have 
nuclear weapons ambitions to use the NPT exclusion for submarine reactor fuel as cover 
for the pursuit of nuclear weapons
6
. Since it is an ongoing project, the research 
methodology was based on the history of the Brazilian nuclear program, official 
speeches, documents and declarations, which were analyzed to assess the real intentions 
of the Brazilian government. In order to confirm my hypothesis, I had to look for any 
                                                        
5 Jack Boureston and James A. Russell, “ Illicit Nuclear Procurement Networks and Nuclear 
Proliferation: Challenges Intelligence, Detection, and Interdiction,” Stair, 2009, p. 41. 
6 Greg Thielmann, and Serena Kelleler-Vergatini, “The Naval Nuclear Reactor Threat to the NPT,” The 
Arms Control Association, July 24, 2013. 
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indication in previous researches that Brazilian enrichment facilities tried to produce or 
accumulate HEU.  
I conclude that there are no reasons to believe that Brazil is willing to resume its 
nuclear weapons program, even though there is no credible way to assess whether the 
country is accumulating HEU at the moment. However, the Brazilian nuclear-powered 
submarine program has potential to pose a threat to the NPT because the spread of 
nuclear fuel enrichment techniques will result in more VNPs. In addition, it will become 
harder for the IAEA inspectors to oversee uranium production and implement the 
safeguards when needed. Since Brazil will open the precedent it is likely that other 
countries will follow suit, which might also lead to the increase of enriched uranium and 
plutonium in the world.  
In the last chapter I ask whether sanctions prevent the engagement of nuclear 
proliferant states in illicit nuclear trade. Basically, there are two reasons that explain the 
emergence of nuclear proliferation networks: the will to build nuclear weapons and the 
impossibility of legally obtaining the required goods. The spread of technological know-
how and manufacturing capabilities in the past decades had a major impact on the nuclear 
weapons and missile programs of several  developing countries, which are able to support 
one another directly at the state-to-state level or indirectly through private sector supplier 
networks. In addition, developing countries have poor history of implementing trade 
controls and UN sanctions
7
.  
The development of these networks of second-tier proliferators will undermine 
the sanctions regime, as developing countries create indigenous nuclear weapons and 
                                                        
7 David Albright, Andrea Stricker, and Houston Wood, “Future World of Illicit Nuclear Trade: 
Mitigating the Threat,” Institute for Science and International Security, July 29, 2013. 
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delivery system technologies, increasingly disconnecting from first-tier state  and trading 
among themselves for the capabilities that their  programs lack. In this paper, first-tier 
refers to advanced industrialized states and second-tier refers to developing industrial 
states with the exception of Russia and China, which are NWS under the NPT
8
. Thus, 
both countries had access to sensitive technology in the early stages of the nuclear era, 
just like the other NWS: U.S, the United Kingdom and France. In this sense, they are 
considered to be first-tier states. 
With regard to methodology, I analyzed two case studies of countries that are 
systematically resorting to illicit nuclear trade, in spite of all the sanctions against them. 
The nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran pose a real threat to the nonproliferation 
regime because they reinforce the risk of latent proliferation, in which countries adhere to 
the NPT but also try to develop nuclear weapons capability. In the long run Iran can 
either continue as nonnuclear weapons state  under the NPT or even follow North 
Korea`s path and withdraw from the treaty.  
In order to assesss the effectiveness of the implementation of sanctions on North 
Korea, I relied on the UN North Korea Sanctions Panel report released on June 2013. 
According to the report, North Korea continues to bypass UN sanctions in order to supply 
its WMD programs, import and export conventional arms, and import luxury goods. At 
the same time, I relied on the UN Iran Sanctions Panel report released on June 2014 to 
assess the implementation of sanctions on Iran. The report shows that Iran has been 
breaching sanctions by procuring both controled and non-controled goods. 
                                                        
8 Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, “ Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security, Vol 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 5-49. 
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I conclude that both countries are still deeply involved in illicit nuclear trade. It is 
interesting to notice that many illicit goods en route to Iran and North Korea are shipped 
from China. However, it is not clear whether the Chinese government is involved or 
everything is just a matter of lax export controls. It is also interesting to notice that 
second-tier developing countries have a poor record of implementing trade controls and 
sanctions and an increasing ability to manufacture reliable dual-use components. Hence, 
sanctions were never adopted universally or applied effectively due to the inexistence of 
efficient export control regimes in second-tier states. 
Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba argue that an effective response to the current 
proliferation challenges must address both the supply and the demand sides of the 
problem. On the one hand, adressing the supply side requires limiting the transfer of 
weapons-grade material or nuclear weapons technology from first-tier suppliers to 
potential proliferators
9
. On the other hand, demand side policies must take into 
consideration the factors that states take into consideration when deciding their nuclear-
weapons and missile delivery sistems. 
After all, the nature of nuclear proliferation has been changing since the Treaty on the 
NPT entered into force in 1970. Throughout these four decades, nuclear technology has 
become more accessible and cheaper due to article IV of the NPT, which acknowledged 
the right to pursue a peaceful nuclear program, and also due to the development of 
several uranium enrichment techniques.  
The international community believed for a long time that nuclear cooperation for 
peaceful purposes would inhibit the proliferation of atomic weapons. During his Atoms 
                                                        
9 Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, “ Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security, Vol 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 5-49. 
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for Peace speech, President Dwight D. Eisenhower affirmed that one of the most 
important responsibilities of the Atomic Energy Agency would be to devise methods 
whereby fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of 
mankind. Therefore, experts would be able to apply nuclear energy to the needs of 




David Fischer explains that the International Atomic Energy Agency was created 
in 1957 in response to “the deep fears and expectations resulting from the discovery of 
nuclear energy
11
.” Its genesis can be traced back to President Eisenhower`s Atoms for 
Peace address to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The NPT was proposed by 
Frank Aiken, Irish Minister for External Affairs. However, it was only opened for 
signature in 1968. It is interesting to notice that accession became nearly universal after 
the end of the Cold War. In 1992, China and France finally signed the treaty, the last of 
the five of the five nuclear weapon states (NWS) recognized by the NPT and in 1995 the 
it was extended indefinitely. 
The NPT rests on three pillars: nonproliferation, the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy, and disarmament. In this sense, the nonproliferation regime is based on the 
underlying assumptions that nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS) would give up nuclear 
weapons if they could have access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation. In 
addition, nuclear weapon states (NWS) should proceed to disarm themselves and pledge 
                                                        
10 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Atoms for Peace,” Voices of Democracy, December 8, 1953. 
http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/eisenhower-atoms-for-peace-speech-text/ 
11 David Fischer, “ History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years,” Vienna: 
The Agency, 1997. http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1032_web.pdf 
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not to transfer nuclear weapons to any recipient or in any way assist, encourage or induce 
any non-nuclear weapon state in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
Article IX of the NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state as a state that manufactured 
and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear device prior to 1 January, 1967
12
. These 
states are: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. All other 
states are non-nuclear weapon states under the Treaty. Under article II of the NPT, non-
nuclear-weapon states pledge not to acquire or exercise control over nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices and not to seek or receive assistance in the manufacture 
of such devices. Under article III of the treaty, non-nuclear weapon states pledge to 
accept IAEA safeguards to verify that their nuclear activities serve only peaceful 
purposes. Finally, article IV acknowledges the right of all parties to develop nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes: “nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the 
inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with 
articles I and II of this treaty.” 
In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that article IV of the NPT is one of 
the three pillars of the NPT that is under attack. It acknowledges the right of all parties to 
develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes but the treaty - aware of the perils of the 
proliferation of nuclear technology – also establishes that NNWS should accept that 
safeguards be applied to all nuclear material used for civilian purposes. Currently, 
however, it is possible to say that nuclear cooperation and proliferation are intertwined 
due to the spread of nuclear technology and its dual-use nature: the same technology that 
                                                        
12 Jacques E.C. Hymans, “ When Does a State Become a Nuclear Weapon State? An Exercise in 
Measurement Validation,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol.17, No 1, March 2010. 
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is used for peaceful purposes can be reversed and used for the destruction of mankind. In 
1979, Albert Wohlstetter was already trying to warn the international community: 
 
If, in fact, technological transfers can bring a “nonnuclear weapon state” within 
weeks, days or even hours of the ability to use a nuclear explosive, in the operational 
sense that “nonnuclear weapon state” will have nuclear weapons. The point is even 
more fundamental than the fact that effective safeguards mean timely warning. A 
necessary condition for timely warning is that there be a substantial elapsed time, 
But if there is no substantial elapsed time before a government may use nuclear 




I have always asked myself whether a regime that establishes five NWS and 
hundreds of NNWS is sustainable in the long term. Any functional regime, according to 
Mohamed ElBaradei, must have a sense of fairness and equity that is not present in the 
NPT
14
. After all, realists argue that institutions or regimes are a mere reflection of the 
distribution of power in the world, despite the fact that a liberals argue that institutions 
are an important cause of peace because they can alter state preferences and change state 
behavior. In this regard, Stephen Krasner defines regimes as “institutions possessing 
norms, decision rules, and procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations
15
.” 
Therefore, they establish acceptable and unacceptable kinds of behavior.  
                                                        
13 Albert Wohlstetter, Gregory Jones, and Roberta Wohlstertter, “Why the Rules Needed Changing,” 
Part I of Towards a New Consensus on Nuclear Technology, vol.1 (Los Angeles: Pan Heuristics, 1979), 
p. 36. 
14 “Virtual Nuclear Powers: a Looming Threat, ElBaradei Warns,” The Guardian, May 2009. 
15 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variable.” International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983. 
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The nonproliferation regime mirrors the distribution of world power right after the 
Second World War. After all, “ the most powerful states create and shape institutions so 
that they can maintain their share of world power
16
.” The very same permanent members 
of the UN Security Council –U.S, United Kingdom, China, Russia and France - are the 
NWS that are legally allowed to have nuclear weapons. The other member states – 
NNWS - are supposed to believe that the P5 are responsible enough to hold the most 
powerful weapons ever invented while they are only supposed to have access to the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy. Despite the obvious inequality, it is possible to say that 
the regime is working from the perspective of the number of adherents: a total of 191 
states have joined the Treaty, though North Korea, which acceded to the NPT in 1985 but 
never came into compliance, announced its withdrawal in 2003.  
The treaty acknowledges the fact that international relations is in a state of 
relentless security competitiveness with the possibility of conflict always in the 
background. In this sense, cooperation against proliferation continued way beyond the 
cold war because of mutual interests in preserving the nuclear status quo that transcended 
bipolarity and not as the result of fundamental changes in international behavior. 
According to realists, the continuing threat of unchecked nuclear proliferation makes 
possible an unusual degree of international cooperation
17
. At the same time, however, 
article X establishes the right to withdraw from the Treaty giving three months` notice 
                                                        
16 John J. Mearsheimer, “ The false Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, 
Winter 1994/95 (Vol. 19, No. 3), pp.5-49. 
17 Zachary S. Davis, “ The Realist Nuclear Regime,” Security Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 3-4, 1993. 
 11 
when member states decide “ (…) that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter 
of this Treaty, have jeopardized supreme interests of its country
18
.”   
North Korea is hitherto the only case of a country that cheated under the Treaty. 
However, the fact that nuclear weapons allow for rapid shift in the balance of power 
creates a window of opportunity for the cheating state to inflict a decisive defeat on the 
victim state. Even though North Korea did not use its nuclear weapons, it opened a 
terrible precedent: the country benefited from peaceful nuclear cooperation under the 
auspices of the NPT, developed nuclear weapons and then withdrew from the Treaty. 
Currently, it is impossible to know how many virtual nuclear powers (VNPs) are willing 
to follow North Korea`s steps and go nuclear. 
In a pessimistic view of the world espoused by realists, “ every state would like to 
be the most formidable military power in the system because this is the best way to 
guarantee survival in a world that can be very dangerous
19
.” If the aim is really to acquire 
more military power at the expense of the enemy, the NPT might be very attractive. At 
the same time, the inequality of the NPT is only sustainable if the non-nuclear weapon 
states are able to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and the nuclear 
weapon states commit to disarmament, so that the former will not be disadvantaged in the 
long term. With the right to access the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology comes the 
responsibility of nonproliferation. Progress on disarmament reinforces efforts to 
strengthen the nonproliferation regime and to enforce compliance. 
                                                        
18 George Bunn and John Rhinelander, “ The Right to Withdraw from the NPT: Article X is Not 
Unconditional, Acronym Website, 1 May 2005, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd79/79gbjr.htm 
19 John J. Mearsheimer, “ The false Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, 
Winter 1994/95 (Vol. 19, No. 3), pp.5-49. 
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Finally, the challenge nowadays is to fix the NPT pillar that establishes the right 
to develop a peaceful nuclear program. However, it is hard to strike the right balance 
between nonproliferation and the development of indigenous nuclear capabilities. In spite 
of all its failures the world will not look better if the whole nonproliferation regime falls 
apart. That is exactly what is going to happen if NWS try to prevent the NNWS to benefit 
from peaceful nuclear cooperation. At the same time, it is hard not to worry when dozens 




The Emergence of Virtual Nuclear Powers: Do They Pose a Real Threat to the 






Since President John F. Kennedy mistakenly predicted that the world would 
witness unparalleled nuclear proliferation in the 1970s, it is easy to be perceived as an 
alarmist when one is trying to predict proliferation and the future of atomic weapons. It is 
important to bear in mind, however, that in 1991, right after the end of the Cold War and 
the fall of the USSR, the Doomsday Clock was set to 17 minutes to midnight, and the 
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists declared that “the illusion that tens of thousands of nuclear 
weapons are a guarantor of national security has been stripped away
20
.” As of July 13, 
2013 the last edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists shows that it is five minutes 
to midnight
21
. Whether the world is more unstable after the end of bipolarity is also a 
good discussion, but certainly the International Agency of Atomic Energy (IAEA) will 
have to multiply its efforts in the following years in order to curb nuclear proliferation, 
since the multipolarity of actors in the international realm and the spread of nuclear 
technology bring new challenges to the negotiation table.   
One of these new challenges is pointed out by Mohamed ElBaradei and 
investigated in this paper. According to him the spread of uranium and plutonium 
                                                        
20 According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and the USSR 
begin to cut down their nuclear stockpile. Furthermore, unilateral and multilateral initiatives such as 
the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks reduce the role of nuclear weapons in both Soviet and American 
strategies. 
21 Currently the Doomsday Clock also incorporates the threats of global warming and the perils of 
nuclear power, just like the accident that happened in Fukushima in 2011, for example.  There is also 
the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts in the Middle East and Asia.  
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enrichment technologies will result in the proliferation of virtual nuclear powers 
(VNPs)
22
. How the VNPs affect the non-proliferation regime? They are defined as virtual 
simply because they will be able to develop nuclear weapons, but they will stop right 
before assembling them. Thus, at the same time VNPs would be able to run enrichment 
and processing plants and abide by the rules of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a phenomenon studied by Albert Wohlstetter in Spreading the 
Bomb Without Quite Breaking the Rules (Wohlstetter 1976). 
This paper argues that the spread of nuclear technology is a trend sustained by the 
belief that nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes would inhibit the proliferation of 
atomic weapons and that this is undermining the crecredibility of the NPT. Currently, the 
main consequence of that trend is the emergence of VNPs around the globe: they are not 
nuclear powers, but they have control over the technology necessary to become one. On 
the one hand they are abiding by the rules of the proliferation regime; on the other hand 
the NPT alone is not enough to stop their emergence, especially after North Korea 
decided that it would be worth to pay the price of going nuclear. The multilateral control 
over the fuel-cycle appeared as a solution to the spread of sensitive technology, which 
presupposes that Non Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) should give up their right to 
develop peaceful technology, while Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) are usually behind 
nuclear assistance and are not fully committed to disarmament, which is their obligation 
under the treaty. Therefore, the NPT is losing credibility both because of the spread of 
nuclear technology and also because to the reaction this trend puts NNWS under the 
pressure of obligatory Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNAs).  
                                                        
22 “Virtual Nuclear Powers a Looming Threat, ElBaradei Warns,” The Guardian, May 2009. 
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The 2004 IAEA Report of the Secretary`s General High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Changes pointed out that at least 40 countries just depend on a political 
decision in order to go nuclear. This paper asks if the emergence of these VNPs 
undermines the credibility of the NPT, especially because they are said to be exploring 
the loopholes in the article IV of the agreement, which establishes one of the three pillars 
of the NPT and acknowledges the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. One 
hypothesis is that this pillar actually leads to nuclear proliferation because it allows 
countries to develop enrichment technology. In the first part of the paper I will clarify the 
definition of Virtual Nuclear Powers and the threat they pose to the non-proliferation 
regime. This first part will also include a theoretical discussion between supply-side and 
demand side approaches. While the former believe that the decision to go nuclear 
depends mainly on the access to technology, the latter defends that each state has security 
needs that will determine whether atomic bombs are necessary to the state`s survival. 
In the second part of the paper I will discuss the three pillars of the NPT, 
highlighting the fact that the pursuit and development of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes is an important part of the bargain between NNWS and NWS. Daniel H. Joyner 
affirms, for example, that the prevailing interpretation of the treaty undermines the pillar 
that acknowledges the right to pursue a peaceful nuclear program. Furthermore, he says 
that world powers are not only imposing harsh conditions on the transfer of civilian 
nuclear technology, but also prioritizing the non-proliferation pillar of the agreement.
23
I 
then analyze what motivate countries to acquire nuclear weapons and also the factors 
behind the two different trends: expansion of nuclear power plants worldwide and 
                                                        
23Daniel H Joyner, “Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2011. 
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investment in indigenous fuel-cycles. Some analysts affirm that nuclear proliferation is 
related to the risk of inter-state conflict, which is currently not likely to happen
24
.  
In the third part of the paper, the objective is to investigate whether nuclear 
cooperation leads to nuclear proliferation, because the basic idea behind the concept of 
VNPs is that the spread of nuclear technology gave them the option of going nuclear. 
Again, it will be necessary to assess the validity of the supply-side theory that advocates 
that states will choose to build atomic bombs if the transference of technology helps them 
to overcome the initial hurdles of the nuclear programs. Matthew Furhmann, for example, 
challenged the belief that the spread of peaceful atomic assistance prevents countries 
from building the bomb. The author analyzed 2000 nuclear cooperation agreements 
(NCAs) signed between 1945 and 2000, concluding that proliferation occurs infrequently, 
but NCAs definitely influence the political decision to build the bomb
25
. Trying to show 
the other side of the picture, Maria Rost Rublee conducted a research to investigate the 
reason why states such as Germany, Japan, Sweden, Egypt and Libya had the option to 
go nuclear, but decided not to carry on military nuclear programs. Even though these 
states decided to keep their peaceful nuclear programs, their latent belligerent nuclear 
capability gives them the status of VNPs, since the final decision is political and not 
technical anymore. 
The fourth part of the paper analyzes the impact of the emergence of VNPs on the 
NPT. The effectiveness of the Treaty depends on the existence of trust between its 
members and on the grand bargain that stems from the three pillars of the agreement, 
                                                        
24 Bruno Tertrais, “ The Demise of Ares: The End of War as we know it?,” The Washington Quarterly, 
Summer 2012, p. 7. 
25Matthew Furhmann, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and the Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreements,” International Security, 2009. 
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because NNWS are committed to non-proliferation while NWS are committed to 
disarmament. However, the regime is losing credibility due to latent proliferation. 
Moreover, MNAs proposed to solve the proliferation problem affect the pillar of the 
agreement that is crucial to NNWS and they would place enrichment and reprocessing of 
nuclear fuel under international control. Rodrigo P. Moreira Penna claims that effective 
MNAs should be limited, regional, multilayered and non-discriminatory in order to be 
effective 
26
.  Many NNWSs simply do not understand the reason why they should give up 
their right to develop indigenous nuclear fuel-cycles, while NWS are not yet fully 
committed to disarmament
27
.   
In order to understand how nuclear cooperation facilitates the political decision to 
build nuclear weapons, I will analyze the Iraqi nuclear program that shifted from civilian 
to military status after Saddam Hussein took office and the Iranian nuclear program, 
whose intent is not clear. I will also analyze the most recent attack to the treaty in a case 
study apart: the withdrawal of North Korea and the development of its military nuclear 
program. Some analysts say that North Korea negotiation techniques served, and are still 
serving, as a model for Iranian officials. In 2007, Sadegh Zibakalam, professor of politics 
at Tehran University, said that the hard-liner Iranian officials were impressed by North 
Korea`s achievement, at the negotiation table, and that they are now more inclined to be 
more resilient and more uncompromising
28
. The declaration makes even more sense 
                                                        
26Rodrigo P Moreira Penna, “Multilateral Nuclear Approaches: Do they provide a credible solution to 
non-proliferation challenges posed by the expected global expansion of the nuclear power sector?,” 
Meridiano 47, 2010,  p.16. 
27 “Interview: Mohamed ElBaradei,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October, 2009, vol. 
65, no. 5, pp. 1-9. 
28Kim Murphy, “Analysts in Tehran Call Korea Pact a Model for Iran,” Los Angeles Times, February 15, 




when we think that the Iranian leadership is playing for an internal audience that has not 
much contact with the rest of the world and that is not willing to see the U.S. dictating 
Iran`s behavior, but rather negotiating among equals. The question that remains 
unanswered is who is going to be the next one to step up to the plate and withdraw from 
the agreement?  
The world is not the same after nuclear weapons were invented. It is amazing to 
imagine that the use of an atomic bomb during World War II inspired such terror 
worldwide that it impelled a large group of countries to give up their nuclear belligerent 
ambitions if a small group of countries commit to disarmament. On the one hand, the 
NPT can be considered a history of success that comprises 190 signatories; on the other 
hand many analysts consider the treaty to be currently under strain and not capable to 






Virtual Nuclear Powers 
 
As of September 1985, a few days after the end of the Third Review Conference 
on the NPT, Paul Leventhal was already calling attention to the perils of latent 
proliferation. He argued that by signing the treaty and agreeing with its terms countries 
would have access to sensitive nuclear technology to begin their civilian nuclear 
programs, a right acknowledged by article IV of the agreement
30
. His preoccupation is 
                                                        
29 Jan Ruzicka, and Nicholas J Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships in the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty,” International Affairs, 2010, p. 69. 
 
30 ARTICLE IV 
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the 
Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without 
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explained by the fact that plutonium is a waste product of reactors that can become an 
explosive after it is separated from spent fuel in reprocessing plants, while highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) is produced in enrichment plants and used as fuel in research 
reactors and in nuclear power plants. Suddenly, the world was witnessing NPT parties 
having access to fissile material that could be diverted from nuclear power plants to build 
atomic warheads, without violating any commitments of the non-proliferation regime. 
Thus, more than two decades ago, Leventhal and Wohlstetter were beginning to define 
the concept of VNPs. 
In 2009, by the end of his tenure as IAEA Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei 
gave an interview to The Guardian warning the world that “virtual nuclear powers were a 
looming threat
31
.” According to him the world would soon witnesses the emergence of at 
least 20 nations with the expertise and materials needed to build nuclear weapons. 
Besides the spread of nuclear technology, the former Director General said that the trend 
would be exacerbated by the inability of the NPT to push its parties for more ambitious 
commitments. He was probably trying to say that it would be hard to convince NNWS 
not to go nuclear, especially those states located in conflict regions, while the five 
recognized NWS were slowing down the pace of nuclear disarmament and modernizing 
and improving their nuclear stockpiles. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. 
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in. the fullest 
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in 
contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further 
development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories 
of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the 
developing areas of the world. 




Since 1985, many predictions about nuclear proliferation have been made and 
many of them were wrong, challenging beliefs and crystallized perceptions of the 
international community. Who would believe, for example, that Taiwan and South Korea 
would gave up their nuclear weapons programs after harsh negotiations with the U.S? By 
that time the only members of the nuclear club were the United States, the Soviet Union, 
the United Kingdom, China and France and the non-proliferation regime comprised only 
127 nations. Many states suspected of building the bomb or considered to be on the verge 
of it were also outside the treaty, such as Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, India, Israel 
and Pakistan. Currently, the nuclear club undesirably expanded and counts with the 
presence of nine associates, one of them - North Korea – was the first country ever to 
withdraw from the treaty. Moreover, evidence shows that the North Korean nuclear 
program was being developed while the country was still party to the agreement. At least 
there were improvements as well: Brazil, Argentina and South Africa phased out their 
nuclear programs in the 1990s, even though the three countries were in different stages of 
their nuclear projects. 
The very concept of VNP implies that NNWS may violate the treaty one day, 
deciding to go nuclear and that one of the pillars of the NPT, which acknowledges the 
right to pursue the development of nuclear programs for peaceful purposes, is actually 
responsible for the spread of sensitive nuclear technology. Furthermore, the concept itself 
is underpinned by the supply-side approach that holds that countries that receive nuclear 
assistance will overcome the initial obstacles of a military nuclear program.  According to 
Matthew Kroenig, for example, states that receive assistance “can leapfrog technical 
design stages, acquire tacit knowledge from more advanced scientific communities, 
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economize on the costs of nuclear development, and avoid international pressure to 
abandon a nuclear program
32
”. 
It is important to stress, however, that most of the literature on nuclear 
proliferation is based on demand-side approaches, which argue that states will look for 
atomic weapons if they are willing to do so and not if they have the opportunity. Usually 
the willingness depends on three factors:  the security environment of the state and its 
necessity to deter external aggression; political lobbies that can foster the development of 
nuclear programs due to distorted worldview and other provincial reasons and also states 
that are in search of international prestige
33
. However, willingness, isolated from other 
factors, does not lead to the development of an expensive and technologically complex 
nuclear weapons program. Especially in developing countries where the resources are 
scarce and the trade-off is big. In a press conference in 1965, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the 
father of the Pakistani nuclear program, once declared that “we will eat grass or leaves, 
even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no alternative.
34
” The Pakistani 
nuclear program shows the perfect combination of necessity and foreign nuclear 
assistance: the Indo-Pakistani war resulted in the loss of a big chunk of territory and of 
millions of citizens that were incorporated to India, an episode that changed the nature of 
the Pakistani nuclear program. In the beginning of the 1980s, China transferred uranium-
enrichment technology and personnel to Pakistan. The Chinese technicians remained in 
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the country until the enrichment facility was fully operational and in 1984 the country 
was capable to assemble atomic weapons
35
. 
If the supply-side approach is correct and nuclear assistance really gives rise to 
VNPs, one of the most important pillars of the treaty is affected and that can generate 
unprecedented crisis, since the NPT itself would be based on wrong premises. Looking 
back a few decades ago it is clear that many expectations concerning nuclear proliferation 
were frustrated, while some trends were confirmed. The Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreements that led to the expansion of the nuclear club were an expected result, since 
nuclear weapons are still envisaged as game changers and supreme guarantors of 
security
36
. In this sense, it is not wrong to suppose that states that have their existence 
threatened will want to develop the most powerful weapons ever invented, if they have 
the opportunity. All the five countries that acquired the bomb outside the nuclear 
weapons club – Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea and South Africa – had to rely on 
foreign assistance to shift from VNPs to nuclear powers
37
. The fact that North Korea 
developed its military program while being a party to the NPT only proves the validity of 
the term and the threat that it poses to the non-proliferation regime. 
 
The Grand Bargain: the Pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons  
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Since the U.S. tested its first nuclear device at Alamogordo, New Mexico, in 
1945, the international community has been trying to find the right balance between the 
benefits of nuclear energy and the horrors of the atomic bomb
38
. The NPT is an attempt 
to regulate the positive and negative aspects of nuclear energy, which can lead mankind 
to progress or to total destruction at the same time. In this sense, the regime tried to 
freeze the reality of the 1960s creating two different clubs: one frequented by the five 
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and the other frequented by Non Nuclear Weapon States 
(NNWS). Such obvious inequality could only be sustained by the so-called grand bargain 
that rests on three pillars: nonproliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy and 
disarmament. The VNPs threat the stability of the regime because the side effects of the 
civilian nuclear programs allow them to have access to technology and fissile materials to 
build bombs if they wish. 
According to article I, NWS are committed to nonproliferation, since they cannot 
transfer nuclear weapons to any country nor help NNWS to acquire or build these nuclear 
devices. In this sense, it is important to make clear that the NPT defines a NWS as a state 
that produced and exploded a nuclear device prior to 1 January, 1967. As mentioned 
these states are Russia, U.S., United Kingdom, China and France, even if the two last 
countries only ratified the treaty in the 1990s. All other countries are considered to be 
NNWS under the treaty. Under article II, NNWS are committed to not acquire or produce 
nuclear weapons and article III states that they will have to accept IAEA safeguards to 
oversee their nuclear programs.  
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Article IV is a case apart because it is intrinsically related to the emergence of the 
VNPs and it is also an important part of the bargain that sustains the NPT. If Stephen 
Walt and the realists are right and power and security, the two basic tenets of the realist 
tradition, are the main forces behind states` behavior, then no country would accept a 
position of inferiority in relation to NWS just because the world is safer with less nuclear 
weapons in the international arena
39
. That is the reason why the inalienable right to 
develop a peaceful nuclear program was considered to be an incentive to non-
proliferation: the have-nots would agree to remain disarmed if they could at least make 
use of nuclear energy to offer better life conditions to their population. Nobody could 
expect at that time that the spread of nuclear technology would also tempt some states to 
go nuclear. 
The inalienable right, however, is considered to be rather ambiguous by some 
analysts
40
. According to article IV, “nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted as affecting 
the inalienable right of all the parties to the treaty to develop research, production and use 
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with 
articles I and II of this treaty.” In the 1970 Pierre Lellouche pointed out, for example, that 
article IV was a guarantee that NNWS would have access to the entire nuclear cycle
41
. 
Fully aware of the implications of a loose article IV, Joseph Nye, as a Carter 
Administration Senior Official in charge of non-proliferation, emphasized that the 
inalienable right should always be interpreted in conformity with articles I and II of the 
                                                        
39Stephen M Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, 1998.  
40 Zhang Xinjun, “ The Riddle of Inalienable Right in Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons: Intentional Ambiguity,” . Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 647-651. 
41Pierre Lellouche, “Breaking the Rule Without Quite Stopping the Bomb: European Views,” 35 
International Organization, 1981. 
 25 
treaty, which tried to prevent transfer, production and purchase of nuclear weapons or 
any other explosive devices
42
. Joseph Nye`s statement may sound obvious nowadays, but 
in that same period Bertrand Goldschmidt, then former chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the IAEA, declared that any restrictions on transmission of sensitive 
nuclear activities were incompatible with the NPT
43
.  
A few decades after that theoretical war, article IV continues to be controversial 
and affirmed as an inalienable right. Iran is always declaring that its nuclear program is 
peaceful
44
, despite the fact that the country has been improving its enrichment technology 
and has already developed a significant amount of Low enriched Uranium and 20% 
enriched uranium, which it is almost 90% of the way necessary to produce weapons 
grade uranium according to specialists
45
. The Iranian dilemma and the fear of another 
case of withdrawal from the NPT, just like happened to North Korea a few years ago, are 
contributing to make the multilateral approach to the nuclear cycle more popular. 
Mohamed ElBaradei once declared that “if you`re not going to produce nuclear weapons, 
you shouldn`t have any problems with the whole nuclear fuel cycle being under 
multinational control
46
.” If the emergence of VNPs undermines one of the pillars of the 
regime, the Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNAs) will also create controversy, 
because they affect the inalienable right of the NNWS. 
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Besides the ambiguity of article IV
47
, the very definition of nuclear proliferation 
under the NPT may be considered controversial. In 1985, Paul Leventhal explained that 
nuclear proliferation is defined more in terms of explosions and acquisition of explosive 
devices rather than in terms of materials, such as HEU and separated plutonium
48
. If the 
use of these materials are intended for peaceful purposes and placed under the safeguards, 
there is no violation of the treaty. According to him, the “Treaty does not restrict – indeed 
it promotes – transfers of spent-fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment materials.” 
The proliferation potential of reactors is clear when we bear in mind that 01 megawatt-
day of operation produces 1 gram of plutonium in any reactor using 20% or lower 
enriched uranium and a 100 (MW (t) reactor produces 100 grams of plutonium per day. 
Therefore, it could produce enough plutonium for one weapon every two months
49
.  
The three pillars of the NPT are supposed to be interconnected in such a way that 
they reinforce each other effectiveness. If the access to nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes increases the risk of proliferation, then at least two pillars of the grand bargain 
are being affected. Ironically, NNWS can still declare that they are fulfilling their 
obligations under the regime. North Korea is an exception and it is really hard to prove 
that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. What about the pillar related to disarmament? 
According to the latest research of the Federation of American Scientists the total 
inventory of nuclear weapons is currently around 17,300. Despite the efforts to decrease 
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their nuclear stockpiles, the U.S. and Russia account together for 16,200 warheads. The 
two countries that set the pace of nuclear disarmament are  
also spending millions of dollars to modernize their stockpiles and to develop better 
delivery systems. Many NNWS considered the pace of disarmament to be slow. The 






In the words of Michael Keks
51
, the inequality of the NPT is only sustainable if 
the NNWS are able to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and the NWS 
commit to disarmament, so that the former will not be disadvantaged in the long term. 
This section shows, however, a lack of interconnection between these two pillars. On the 
one hand, the fact that article IV is ambiguous and the definition of nuclear proliferation 
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is loose may have contributed to the spread of HEU and plutonium all over the world. On 
the other hand, NWS are not fully committed to nuclear disarmament.  
 
Nuclear Cooperation and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation 
 
 
If the supply-side theory approach is correct and nuclear cooperation results in 
nuclear weapons proliferation, or at least it allows for the emergence of the VNPs, it is 
possible to surmise that the NPT contained the seeds of its own destruction and the 
Atoms for Peace speech actually contributed to nuclear arms race
52
. President Dwight 
Eisenhower had, of course the best of intentions and was trying to find “the way by 
which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but 
consecrated to his life.” Not only was the speech one of the first calls against nuclear 
proliferation, but also inspired the creation of the IAEA in 1956. Since his remarkable 
address before the United Nations General Assembly in December 1953, however, most 
analysts believe that nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes does not lead to nuclear 
weapons proliferation.  
According to some analysts, very few states feel compelled to acquire nuclear 
weapons and that explains the reason why just a few of them went nuclear almost seven 
decades after the invention of atomic weapons. As it was mentioned in this paper, the 
demand-side approach declares that states will resort to nuclear weapons if they want to 
and not if they have the opportunity. Some authors even say that atomic weapons made 
sense during the Cold War period, when there was the possibility of war between states. 
Currently, the only risk of war resides in sub-state conflicts, usually caused by ethnic 
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. Therefore, nuclear weapons would be something inherited from the Cold War 
and served well for deterrence purposes during bipolarity era, when the U.S. and the 
USSR were able to convince their allies of the benefits of not going nuclear and staying 
under the protection of their leadership. 
Another interesting point raised by demand-side approach analysts is that the 
nonproliferation regime was able to create a taboo against nuclear weapons that is easily 
verifiable. The last time they were used in conflict was in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during 
World War II. The terrible aftermath of the atomic explosions in Japan and the 
development of the non-proliferation regime only contributed to increase the political 
costs of the use of nuclear weapons. Christoph Bluth shows that the diffusion of 
international norms inhibits most states from using nuclear weapons and from even trying 
to acquire them. Furthermore, the dynamics of war are also changing from intrastate 
conflict to interstate conflicts and nuclear weapons represent a huge investment that 
would only be used for deterrence. Even from a quantitative point of view it is easy to see 
that most countries decided to adhere to the nonproliferation efforts. Even countries such 
as Germany and Japan decided not to build the bomb, despite their capacity to do so. 
Moreover, the use of force in international relations is not as legitimate as it was in the 
19
th





It is undeniable that many countries still envisage nuclear weapons as supreme 
guarantors of their security
55
. In order to get the ticket to the nuclear energy club, for 
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example, Iran spent at least $ 11 billion in the construction of its Busheshr reactor, which 
took almost four decades to complete and is one of the most expensive of its kind. 
Currently the reactor produces 2% of Iran`s electricity needs, while 15 % of the country`s 
generated electricity is lost through old and ill-maintained transmission lines
56
. Maybe 
Iran is an exceptional case because its nuclear project has been dragging on for decades, 
but the fact is that according to some studies nuclear assistance helps to overcome initial 
hurdles and makes the decision to go nuclear easier
57
. Furthermore, nuclear technology is 
still expensive but it is getting cheaper everyday. According to Matthew Kroenig, for 
example, countries receiving enrichment and reprocessing facilities, bomb designs, or 
significant quantities of weapons-grade fissile material are more likely to acquire the 
bomb
58
.   
In his work Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear 
Proliferation, Matthew Kroenig also stresses that the initial hurdles of a nuclear program 
can be broken down in four different phases. First of all, it is costly for states to go after 
some nuclear technologies such as uranium enrichment plants and implosion type nuclear 
weapons, because they are very sophisticated and hard to design indigenously. Second, 
the construction and operation requires numerous attempts that usually result in failure. 
He cites, for example, that Iraq tried to produce HEU in many different ways before 
deciding on electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS). Iraqi engineers also tested 
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gaseous centrifuge, chemical enrichment, ion exchange and laser isotope separation
59
. 
The third obstacle refers to the costs involved in the development of a nuclear 
infrastructure, especially when countries do not have all the necessary means available at 
home. In its attempt to build nuclear weapons, it is known that Iraq had to partner with 
many western companies and spent billions of dollars unsuccessfully. Finally, the last 
obstacle refers to the international political pressure involved in the attempt to move from 
a peaceful nuclear program to military one. Sometimes this political pressure results in 
military strikes such as the Israeli strike that destroyed the Osirak reactor in Iraq and the 
Al Kibar nuclear reactor in Syria 
60
. 
After overcoming the three initial obstacles highlighted by Matthew Kroenig it is 
already possible to say that the country is a VNP, since the decision to go nuclear will 
only face political difficulties not technical ones. Once again, the Iraq case study is 
illustrative. Hussein al-Shahristani, Iraqi nuclear scientist and politician, once said that 
Saddam Hussein changed the nature of Iraq`s nuclear program right after assuming the 
country leadership in 1979. The scientist also revealed that Western companies assisted 
the country to enrich uranium to weapons grade. Actually, Iraq came close to enrich 
uranium to 93 percent. According to him those companies also helped Iraq to develop 
“complex detonation devices crucial to the successful explosion of a nuclear weapon 
61
.” 
The NTI website highlights the fact that Hussein al-Shahristani escaped from prison 
during the Gulf War and the date and location of his declaration were not given. His 
                                                        
59 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), “Iraq Nuclear Chronology,” NTI Website, last updated, 2009, 
Accessed July 20, 2013. http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/iraq_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791 
60 “The Story of Operation Orchard: How Israel Destroyed Syria Al Kibar Nuclear Reactor ,“ Spiegel 
Online International, 2009, Accessed July 20, 2013. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-
story-of-operation-orchard-how-israel-destroyed-syria-s-al-kibar-nuclear-reactor-a-658663.html 
61Darwis Ghalih, “Scientist Views Iraq`s, Iran Nuclear Programs,” London, Al-Majallah, 28 January, 
1996, pp. 22-24. 
 32 
interview shows how important international nuclear cooperation is for a country that is 
deciding to move from the status of VNP to nuclear power. His personal life also 
demonstrates how a young student with exceptional aptitude for science had to study 




The Iraq case is just one example of how nuclear cooperation and proliferation are 
intertwined due to the dual-use nature of technology and know-how 
63
. Matthew 
Fuhrmann goes a little bit further in his analysis and establishes a direct relationship 
between what he calls peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear weapons proliferation, 
analyzing 2,000 NCAs signed from 1945 to 2000
64
. He concludes that “nuclear aid 
increases the likelihood of acquiring the bomb by about 360 percent; the combination of 
atomic assistance and militarized disputes increases the probability of building nuclear 
weapons by 750 percent.” It is possible to infer that the demand-side approach does not 
provide a complete explanation for nuclear proliferation, but it is determinant when 
combined with access to nuclear technology expertise. However, this relationship is 
probabilistic not deterministic, simply because not all recipients of assistance will cross 
the nuclear threshold 
65
. The author also concluded that 78% of the nuclear power states 
received some sort of assistance and no country acquired nuclear weapons without 
receiving aid from 1953 to 2000. 
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The work of Matthew Fuhrmann is crucial to understand how article IV of the 
NPT was determinant to consolidate the era of the VNPs. While only France, U.S. and 
the United Kingdom began their programs without any kind of cooperation, all the other 
nuclear powers received civilian assistance. How many countries will begin their military 
nuclear programs and change their status from VNP to nuclear power states only depends 
on the fragile stability of the international system. Once the nuclear infrastructure is 
installed the decision to go nuclear will depend on demand-side considerations, such as a 
state`s security environment, international norms and political motivations 
66
. The irony 
behind article IV is that international community has been behaving as though peaceful 
atomic assistance would lead the world towards effective arms control policy and not to 
nuclear proliferation 
67
. In this sense, the nuclear assistance paved the way for the 
emergence of VNPs, undermining one of the main pillars of the NPT. 
 
Credibility of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
 
 
In 2005, Mohamed ElBaradei said that the NPT has been sufficient to prevent 
nuclear proliferation for the past three decades, but in order to continue to exist it must 
adapt to the new challenges imposed by a changing international system 
68
. The former 
Director General has been warning the international community about new threats such 
as the spread of sensitive nuclear know-how that leads to the emergence of the VNPs; the 
                                                        
66George H Quester, “The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation,” The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
1973. 
67 Matthew Furhmann, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and the Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreements,” International Security, 2009, pp. 39-41. 
68“ Statements of IAEA Director General Dr Mohamed ElBaradei in 2005 Review Conference of the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” IAEA, 2005. 
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2005/ebsp2005n006.html 
 34 
uneven degree of physical protection of nuclear materials from country to country; the 
limitations of IAEA safeguards; the reliance on nuclear deterrence and the mistrust 
relationship between NWS and NNWS. Zhang Xinjun explained that “a treaty is not a 
finished product but a matter under continual construction by consensual method
69
” and 
multilateral talks are already trying to catch up to the new realities that put the regime 
under strain.  
At this point of the paper it is clear that the emergence of VNPs is closely related 
to the spread of nuclear technology, an inalienable right acknowledged under article IV of 
the NPT. In order to restore credibility in the non-proliferation regime it is necessary to 
fix one of its pillars and the problem is that it will cause more mistrust, since it affects the 
grand bargain that sustains the whole regime. As traditional non-proliferation 
mechanisms such as safeguards and export controls were not sufficient to prevent the 
spread of nuclear technology, the solution to control the emergence of VNPs is to put 
centers for the enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel under international control, 
the so called Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNAs)
70
. Moreira Penna explains that 
comprehensive MNAs have already been suggested to prevent nuclear proliferation. The 
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), for example, is based on fuel leasing and 
suppliers are supposed to provide nuclear fuel and buy it back for disposal or 
reprocessing, while the Six-State Assurance of Supply, a joint effort that involves U.S., 
France, Germany, Russia, UK, and the Netherlands, is a initiative that guarantees a 
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constant fuel supply by one of the countries 
71
. Some countries are also beginning to 
develop regional enrichment projects. In 2008, for example, Brazil and Argentina have 
signed a bilateral agreement to begin a joint uranium enrichment program 
72
. 
Some specialists believe that MNAs are not a reality because of mistrust, since 
NNWS do not understand why they should give up their indigenous nuclear fuel-cycle 
programs while NWS are not fully committed to disarmament. The matter illuminates the 
fragile balance between NWS and NNWS and stresses the importance of trusting 
relationships to the non-proliferation regime. That is maybe the reason why states choose 
to build their own fuel cycles even when that is not the most rational economic option. 
According to some specialists, buying small quantities of enriched uranium is cheaper 
than investing in indigenous uranium enrichment facilities. Decker and Michel-Kerjan 
also stress, however, that countries have at least three good reasons to try to enrich their 
own uranium: “(I) a fuel cycle ability provides more commercial and political stability to 
the nuclear reactors` fuel supply, which in turn lowers the expected discounted cost of the 
total electric power per kilowatt-hour delivered; (II) while providing an assured source of 
supply, an enrichment facility can also cover part of its cost by providing enrichment 
services to other countries and other reactors (including research reactors); (III) the 
enrichment capability is often viewed as providing increased prestige and power, and 
allows for the option of a possible breakout to nuclear weapon capabilities 
73
.” 
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It is not possible to talk about the problem of trust in the non-proliferation regime 
without citing the study of Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas J. Wheeler, who argue that the 
grand bargain of the NPT is also underpinned by trusting relationships. The authors 
define trusting relationships as “one into which actors enter knowing that as a 
consequence they increase their vulnerability to other actors whose behavior they do not 
control, with potentially negative consequences for themselves
74
.” They also argue that 
the main reason for distrust among the members of the NPT is the spread of civil nuclear 
cycles and “the weaponization possibilities they bring”, since at least 40 governments 
could start their military nuclear programs if they decide to do so 
75
. The fact that the 
NWS still rely heavily on nuclear weapons for their security also has a direct impact on 
the behavior of NNWS, contributing to spread the feeling of distrust among those who do 
not have atomic bombs, but see no reason not to exercise the right acknowledged under 
article IV: the right to develop indigenous fuel-cycle capabilities 
76
. 
The pessimistic view espoused by Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas J. Wheeler is not 
supported by Christoph Bluth, for example. He highlights the fact that most states do not 
believe that nuclear weapons are required for their security, especially because the 
decision to go nuclear has heavy political consequences nowadays and the nature of 
conflicts has changed after the end of Cold War 
77
. Moreover, atomic weapons are not so 
useful in the intrastate conflicts that prevail in the 21
st
 century. The author also stresses 
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that NPT has a solid history of success, with its 191 members, and nuclear proliferation is 
actually very rare. According to him, “what is required to sustain the NPT is not the 
building of trust, but reassurance. Reassurance does not involve the voluntary acceptance 
of vulnerability, but rather the reduction in vulnerability vis-à-vis potential adversaries.” 
The North Korean nuclear program is a typical case of peaceful nuclear 
cooperation that resulted in a nuclear weapons program. North Korea joined the Treaty in 
1985 and decided to withdraw in 2003, after using the membership to develop a nuclear 
weapons program, which culminated in nuclear tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013
78
. 
Furthermore, the country has been using its status as nuclear power to try to gain more 
political leverage in international negotiations, making threats in order to bargain. The 
North Korean strategy has also been defined as a model for Iranian negotiators, who 
quickly learned that they should be hard bargainers and use contentious strategy 
79
. At 
that time the Iranian scholar Sadegh Zibakalam once declared that “this scenario has been 
at the back of the minds of some Iranian leaders: that if we reach a stage that we would 
be respected as an equal partner, then we could do real negotiations and reach a deal over 
our nuclear program.”  
With regard to the Iranian nuclear program, some analysts say that the country is 
not investing in the development of nuclear weapons, since it just want to have control 
over the complete nuclear cycle enrichment. That is the very concept of VNP. According 
to some reports, the Iranian nuclear program has some controversial parts such as the 
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VVER-1000 MWe light water reactor at Bushehr, a uraniuam conversion facility at 
Esfahan, enrichment facilities at Natanz and Qom, a heavy water production plant and a 
heavy water research reactor under construction in Arak
80
. When questioned about the 
possible military dimension of its program, Iranian officials usually argue that the 
country has the inalienable right to develop peaceful nuclear technology. 
In order to understand how the credibility of the non-proliferation regime is under 
strain it is important to highlight the fact that the loopholes that allow countries to 
become VNPs are generating distrust among signatories. At the same time, NWS feel 
obliged to react to the latent perils of nuclear cooperation and are proposing the MNAs 
that would put the nuclear fuel-cycle under international control. Therefore, if many 
countries already depend on the benefits of extended deterrence in order to survive, now 
they will have to trust that other countries will supply them with all the uranium they 
need for their reactors. All the situation leads to a cycle of distrust among the signatories 
that undermines the grand bargain that sustains the Treaty. 
 
Case Study: North Korea 
 
 
In hindsight, North Korea`s decision to go nuclear makes sense and looks quite 
obvious: the authoritarian communist regime, with perceived international enemies, have 
decided to initiate a civilian nuclear program by the end of the 1950s, under the auspices 
of the Soviet government, and finally conducted its first nuclear test a few decades later, 
in 2006, after withdrawing from the NPT. After weighing the pros and cons North Korea 
decided to shift its status from VNP to a real nuclear power and struck a blow against the 
                                                        
80 “Iran Country Profiles,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), NIT website, last update July 2013. 
Accessed July 22,2013.  http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/ 
 39 
non-proliferation regime, exposing all vulnerabilities of the Treaty: the article IV that 
helped develop a military nuclear program; the safeguards that did not prevent nuclear 
proliferation; the withdrawal clause that was convenient to hide North Korean real 
intentions.  
The North Korean case demonstrates how the signing of a peaceful nuclear 
cooperation with the Soviets in 1959 wound up in the acquisition of the bomb a few 
decades later. The USSR trained North Korean nuclear scientists in the 1950s and helped 
to build the Yongbyon nuclear complex in 1962
81
. The Soviet aid allowed the country to 
operate its nuclear weapons program in 1983, when the Yongbyon complex was 
employed to produce plutonium that would be used later to conduct its first nuclear test
82
. 
As it was predicted by the supply-side approach the assistance helped the country to 
overcome its initial hurdles. Acquiring fissile material – plutonium-239 or highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) – is the main obstacle in a military nuclear program. According 
to some specialists the production of these two materials is hard while weaponization is 
considered to be relatively easy. Some reports indicate that Chinese companies have been 
supplying key components and raw materials for North Korea`s missile program since 
1999
83
. Currently, the country has rockets Unha to launch satellites, short range Scud-
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North Korea had enough time to master the engineering requirements of its 
nuclear program until it acceded to the NPT in 1985 as a NNWS, a condition imposed by 
the USSR: the Soviet would only supply the North Korean power station if the country 
agreed to abide by the rules of the non-proliferation regime
85
. According to article III 
states party to the NPT are compelled to accept safeguards in an agreement with the 
IAEA, in order to verify its obligation under article II to refrain from manufacturing or 
acquiring atomic weapons
86
. In this sense, North Korea had to provide a description of its 
nuclear program, materials and facilities and also guarantee that inspectors would have 
access after the country ratified its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1992. 
Currently it is widely recognized that the safeguards were violated between 1992 and 
2002, when the IAEA inspectors were expelled from the country after requesting further 
access to North Korean nuclear facilities.  
North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985 but only concluded its Safeguard 
Agreement with the IAEA in 1992. It is believed that between 1989 and 1991 the country 
extracted up to ten kilograms of plutonium from its research reactor at Yongbyon through 
reprocessing of the spent fuel rods 
87
. Jeffrey Goldstein holds that by that time North 
Korean officials quickly learned how to use the nuclear program to gain leverage and, in 
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1993 the country threatened the Clinton administration by withdrawing from the NPT and 
forcing the North-Korea-U.S. high-level talks
88
. In the agreed framework that resulted 
from the bilateral negotiations, North Korea was convinced to stop its nuclear program 
for about US$ 5 billion in energy-related assistance and the lifting of economic 
sanctions
89
. In 2006, North-Korean officials gained some leverage in the Six-Party Talks 
after conducting their first nuclear test. Goldstein also affirms that the second nuclear test 
in 2009 North Korea`s intent was to force the U.S. to give up the denuclearization of the 
country and to accept its status as real nuclear power. Finally the country carried out a 




Besides cheating under the non-proliferation regime and using its status as VNP 
to gain leverage in the negotiation table, North Korea`s withdrawal from the NPT helped 
undermine the credibility of the treaty. After expelling the IAEA inspectors, in 2003 
North Korea made use of Article X of the NPT alleging that the American policy was 
threatening its existence, jeopardizing its supreme interests
91
. North Korean allegations 
that it would suffer a pre-emptive nuclear attack from the U.S. were actually an attempt 
to divert attention away from their real objectives: resume missile testing, begin to 
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reprocess spent fuel rods and reactivate its nuclear facilities. The withdrawal from the 
NPT finally let North Korea free from the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and the 
country could finally carry on its military nuclear program: article 26 of the agreement 
declares that it would remain in force as long as the democratic People`s Republic of 
Korea is party to the non-proliferation regime
92
.  
There is a general sense of impunity surrounding the North Korean case and a fear 
that other VNPs will follow suit. Pierre Goldschmidt captured the essence of the problem 
when he declared that “the great benefit that the NPT brings to the international 
community would be dangerously eroded if countries violating their safeguards 
agreements or the NPT felt free to withdraw from the treaty, develop nuclear weapons, 





This paper looked into how the emergence of VNPs affects the non-proliferation 
regime. After realizing that the spread of nuclear technology is a trend and that VNPs are 
the consequence of that trend, it was necessary to discuss the grand bargain and the three 
pillars of the NPT. Using the study of Matthew Fuhrmann to underpin the argument that 
nuclear cooperation leads to proliferation, it is possible to see that “technology-based 
arguments are probabilistic, not deterministic”
93
 and that his conclusions point to a trend. 
It is easy to rule out his observations by saying that most countries do not go nuclear, but 
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it is not so easy to ignore that the spread of nuclear technology resulted in the emergence 
of VNPs and is therefore a source of distrust for the members of the NPT. A few NNWS 
such as Germany and Japan may never build nuclear bombs, but it takes only one case  – 
North Korea – to put the whole non-proliferation regime under strain. 
As it was mentioned, the reaction to the new threats is always to demand that 
NNWS give up their inalienable right, as ambiguous as it is, to develop peaceful nuclear 
programs. At the same time it is not possible to say that NWS are fully committed to the 
nuclear disarmament, which only stresses the inequality of the regime and the feeling of 
insecurity since it is part of the original bargain to “preclude the vast majority of 
signatories from the possibility of acquiring the most powerful weapons and thus limits 
their capability of achieving national security by military means
94
”. In this sense NNWS 
may feel that they accepted a position of vulnerability without receiving anything in 
exchange. 
Many analysts argue that nuclear weapons are not as necessary as they used to be 
a few years ago, because the new wars that result from ethnic disputes are characterized 
as internal conflicts and atomic weapons are effective for interstate conflicts. However, 
the international realm is very dynamic and interstate conflicts may happen again, 
especially if Iran decides to go nuclear. Ed Husain, for example, is already talking about a 
Cold War in the Middle East between Iran and Saudi Arabia, a traditional case of latent 
interstate conflict worsened by the millenary Sunni-Shiite power struggle 
95
. A nuclear 
Iran would probably change the whole dynamics of the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia, 
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Turkey and Egypt would follow suit, establishing a multipolar nuclear arena in the most 
volatile region of the world
96
. 
The three examples aforementioned also demonstrated how the nuclear non-
proliferation regime was not enough to curb the nuclear programs in Iraq, North Korea 
and Iran, let alone the Syrian reactor that was bombed by Israeli jets. If Iran is still a 
riddle, and Iraq is finally under control after a long war, North Korea is the bad example 
that clearly undermined the credibility of the non-proliferation regime, but that can also 
be useful in the future because it points out the loopholes that allow VNPs to go nuclear. 
The NPT cannot be effective only for those who are willing to cooperate. The nuclear 
non-proliferation regime will only be effective if states believe that noncompliance will 
be punished.  
At the same time, establishing MNAs resting on voluntary participation might be 
a promising way to restore the credibility of the NPT, since the present legal framework 
does not oblige countries to participate in these arrangements. It is important to bear in 
mind, however, that countries would only enter into MNA according to economic and 
political incentives offered by these arrangements. From an economic perspective, it is 
undeniable that buying small quantities of uranium is cheaper than investing in 
indigenous enrichment facilities but NNWS do not trust NWS enough to give up the right 
to develop their own nuclear facilities. 
Hence, in addition to the economic incentive it is necessary to develop an 
environment of mutual trust and consensus among all states party to the NPT, which 
should be based on full compliance with the agreed nuclear non-proliferation obligations. 
                                                        




As proposed by the expert group report to the Director General of the IAEA, “in a 
voluntary arrangement covering assurances of supply, recipient countries would at least 
for the duration of the respective supply contract, renounce the construction and 
operation of sensitive fuel cycle facilities and accept safeguards of the highest current 
standards including comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol.” NWS would 
also have to do their part and fully commit to disarmament 97. 
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Brazil`s Quest for Nuclear Independence: The Nuclear-Powered Submarine 




Currently, all the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, 
which are also Nuclear Weapon States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), have nuclear-powered submarines. Outside the club only India 
has one nuclear submarine and Brazil, as a non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT, is 
investing in its own program in cooperation with France. According to Eric Arnett, some 
observers have speculated that the purpose of the Indian nuclear submarine program was 
“ intended to provide an invulnerable launching platform for nuclear weapons
98
.” The 
Brazilian program is also raising concern among analysts. In this sense, this paper will 
investigate whether the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine program poses a growing 
risk to achieving the nonproliferation goals of the treaty due to the dual-use technology 
dilemma: the same technology that makes fuel for nuclear reactors can also produce 
explosive material for nuclear bombs. 
In the first part of the paper I will discuss the reason why the NPT does not 
establish safeguards for material used in NPRs in order to understand the perils behind 
the Brazilian nuclear powered-submarine program. Many policymakers and analysts 
believe that the NPT has been preventing the spread of nuclear weapons across the globe 
in the past decades. From another perspective, however, it is possible to affirm that the 
treaty helped stabilize the arms race in a bipolar world even though it was not prepared 
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for the challenges posed by the spread of dual-use technology in a multipolar world. 
Goods and technologies are considered dual-use when they can be used both for civil and 
military purposes. In this regard, the right to pursue a peaceful nuclear program led to the 
expansion of nuclear power plants worldwide and investment in indigenous fuel-cycles, 
which was an important part of the agreement between nonnuclear weapon states 
(NNWS) and nuclear weapon states (NWS). Currently, there are approximately 1,440 




In the second part, I will analyze the technology involved in the nuclear marine 
propulsion, a device in which chain reactions are initiated, controlled and sustained at a 
steady rate
100
. Since only 0,7% of the uranium found in nature is U 235, it is necessary to 
enrich the uranium fuel to operate the reactor. Thus, the development of a naval nuclear 
reactor may lead to the mastery of a complete nuclear fuel cycle. Besides the spread of 
nuclear technology there is also another problem: plutonium is the byproduct of uranium 
enrichment. Just like HEU, plutonium could also be stolen by terrorists seeking to build 
nuclear weapons. Moreover, the NPT might be successful against the spread of nuclear 
weapons but it does not explicitly regulates the production, use and disposal of HEU for 
naval nuclear reactors. Greg Thielmann, for instance, highlights the fact that nuclear 
submarine programs creates a military requirement for producing and stockpiling 
uranium enriched to a higher level than needed in civilian power reactors. Therefore, the 
Brazilian precedent would make it easier for other states that may have nuclear weapons 
                                                        
99 Corey Hinderstein, and Andrew Newman, and Ole Reistad, “From HEU Minimization to 
Elimination: Time to Change the Vocabulary,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2012.  
100 Gheorghe Constantin, “Nuclear Marine Propulsion,” Constanta Maritime University, Romania, 
2009.  
 48 
ambitions to use the NPT exclusion for nuclear submarine reactor fuel as cover for the 
pursuit of nuclear weapons
101
. 
In the third part of the paper I will investigate the reasons why a peaceful country 
such as Brazil is investing US$ 5 billion in the development of a nuclear-powered 
submarine program. After the former Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, Roberto 
Abdenur, said that “ submarines are not subject to the safeguards regimen
102
” there is a 
growing debate on the primary purposes of the Brazilian Navy. According to Science 
magazine, for example, a uranium enrichment facility would give Brazil the breakout 
capability to produce enough fissionable material for six nuclear warheads a year
103
. It is 
important to stress that much of the speculation around the program does not take into 
account the constitutional prohibition of the construction of nuclear weapons in Brazil 
and also agreements such as the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the agreement between Argentina, 
Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards. Not to 
mention, of course, the fact that Brazil has been an active member of the NPT since 1998.  
The fact that the Brazilian establishment believes that the United Nations role in 
global governance still reflects the immediate post-WWII era helps clarify many political 
decisions related to the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine program. As pointed out by 
the former Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, emerging countries are still 
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struggling to find a place under the sun. Until recently, almost all global decisions related 
to peace and security were made by the permanent members of the Security Council: 
United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China and France
104
. Thus, it is widely perceived 
that NNWs have more obligations under the NPT than NWS, which are not fully 
committed to disarmament. 
 Currently, however, it is hard to discuss multilateral issues of war, peace and 
commerce without taking into consideration the position of countries such as Brazil, 
India, Turkey and a few other global players that are also shaping international relations. 
Emerging countries have their needs and are already feeling the costs of progress. 
Decades ago, Brazil experienced problems trying to import nuclear fuel and nuclear 
technology. Therefore, Brazil`s nuclear policy is based on self-sufficiency, technological 
progress and independence and that explains the persistence of the country in developing 
a nuclear fuel cycle, building nuclear power plants and nuclear powered submarines
105
. 
As of 2007, 31 countries were  using about 440 commercial nuclear reactors to generate 
about 16 percent of the world`s electricity
106
. Unfortunately, the same technology that 




In 2013 President Dilma Rousseff said that Brazil is set to join the select group of 
countries that have nuclear-powered submarines, such as the United States, Russia, 
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France, Britain and China 
107. She was probably advised to avoid any mention of India, 
whose program began in the 1980s with a leased Soviet nuclear submarine and now is in 
the process of developing an indigenously built nuclear submarine capability. Unlike 
Brazil, India is not part of the NPT and will probably use its vessels as launching 
platforms for its nuclear weapons. The fact that Brazil will have access to sensitive 
nuclear technology and the HEU used in NPRs will be outside the IAEA safeguards 
agreement is again raising concerns related to the perils of latent proliferation. Will the 
mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle make it easy for Brazil to resume its nuclear weapons 
project?  
The right to pursue and develop a peaceful nuclear program is an important part 
of the bargain between NNWS and NWS but the relation between nuclear cooperation 
and the spread of nuclear weapons has helped divide state members of the NPT into 
sharply opposing groups. World powers are currently imposing harsh conditions on the 
transfer of civilian nuclear technology and also prioritizing the nonproliferation pillar of 
the agreement 
108
. At the same time, they are undermining the NPT pillar related to 
disarmament due to the modernization of nuclear stockpiles. Hans Kristensen affirms that 
“ the United States has embarked on an overhaul of its entire nuclear weapons enterprise, 
including development of new weapons delivery systems and life extension programs 
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The credibility of the NPT is clearly at stake. Since the beginning of the 
nonproliferation regime, many analysts have been worried about the perils of latent 
proliferation, since civilian nuclear programs could lead to the accumulation of plutonium 
as a by-product of reactors and can become explosive after the separation from spent fuel 
in reprocessing plants. Even though all the material that is supposed to be used in civilian 
nuclear programs is under safeguards there is always the latent risk that they could be 
diverted from nuclear power plants to be used in nuclear weapons. NPRs offer much 
higher risks because all the material destined to non-proscribed military activities are 
outside IAEA safeguards.  
In addition to the perils of latent proliferation, global submarine proliferation is 
also a trend that is raising concern worldwide. Despite the fact that the number of 
submarines active in the oceans decreased after the end of the Cold War, submarine 
procurement has been increasing in the past decades and it is likely that a undersea arms 
race is gathering momentum. David Lague affirms, for example, that “many of the major 
submarine purchasers (including Pakistan, India, Israel and China) are in regions of 
concern and some possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which may be deployed 
on these new submarines, thanks to the relative ease of acquiring cruise missiles on the 
international market 
110.” Another potential problem, according to James Clay Moltz, is 
that countries such as Brazil may be using nuclear submarine programs to develop a full 
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. In addition, they would have access to HEU and possibly other NPT 
members would follow suit. There is always the possibility that potential virtual nuclear 
powers will try to divert HEU fuel to a bomb project because that is the dual nature of the 
nuclear technology.  
In the global submarine proliferation market, France is recognized as a country 
that has often been providing technology transfer to purchasers who want to develop their 
own indigenous technology. France has provided Agosta-class diesel boats and 
production technology to Pakistan and in 2003 India`s Defence Ministry declared that it 
had strike a deal with France to produce six advanced Scorpene-class diesel submarines 
that will be built in India
112
. It is interesting to notice that Pakistan offered a second hand 
Agosta-class submarine to Saudi Arabia, showing that France`s export might be 
contributing to the development of secondary market with unforeseeable consequences. It 
is well reported that the Saudis have nuclear ambitions and that the Iranians own a fleet 
of Russian vessels
113
.  In the agreement with Brazil, France will build four diesel 
submarines and provide assistance with the non-nuclear components of one nuclear 
submarine. 
Greg Thielmann calls attention to the fact that the acquisition of fissile material is 
the biggest obstacle to building nuclear weapons and that is the reason why the 
prohibition of uranium enrichment above levels used in civilian power reactors would 
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work as an important barrier to proliferation. He also adds that the exclusion of HEU for 
NPRs from the IAEA safeguards confers legitimacy to the enrichment and stockpiling of 
HEU, which could be diverted for use in a nuclear weapons program. In this context, 
Brazil, as the first NPT NNWS with a nuclear-powered submarine, could set a dangerous 
precedent for states with nuclear ambitions, such as Iran. Senior Iranian naval officers 
have already declared that they are considering to build their own nuclear submarines 
using HEU up to 45-56%. Therefore, Thielmann affirms that the IAEA “ should seek 
enhancements to safeguards agreements that tighten monitoring measures for uranium 
designated for naval nuclear reactors 
114
.”  
Every discussion that involves the proliferation risks of nuclear power programs 
due to the dual-use of nuclear technology must take into consideration the article IV of 
the NPT, which declares that a state has the right to peaceful nuclear technologies as long 
as it maintains safeguards on its peaceful nuclear program and does not manufacture 
nuclear explosives. Charles D. Ferguson affirms that “ this article does not specifically 
mention uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies as part of a state`s 
right to peaceful nuclear technologies, it does not explicitly exclude enrichment and 
reprocessing technologies 
115
.” It is important to stress that has been considerable debate 
whether this right should be interpreted to include bomb usable technologies, even 
though the right has usually been interpreted to include these technologies.  
In spite of the bilateral cooperation in the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for 
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the dual nature of the Brazilian 
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nuclear program is already raising concern among some scholars in Argentina, even 
though there are no official declarations of the Argentinian government against Brazilian 
nuclear policies. According to Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, for example, “ the episodic and 
public manifestations of voices in favor of nuclear weapons in Brazil generate genuine 
worries in Argentina, both in the government and among interested citizens 
116
.” Indeed 
in 2009 Vice President Jose Alencar said that nuclear weapons could provide Brazil with 
a deterrent and result in more respectability from the international community, especially 
after the discovery of huge oil reserves in the pre-salt layers.
117
 Interesting to notice, 
however, that his words had more repercussion abroad than in Brazil, where his cause did 
not find many supporters. Argentina`s skepticism is also explained by the rivalry between 
the two countries when both were pursuing the construction of nuclear weapons decades 
ago. In 1974, Argentina put into operation the first nuclear power plant in Latin America.  
Togzhan Kassenova interpreted the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine in a 
different way. Aware that Brazil tried to build the bomb in the past, she understands that 
after signing the NPT in 1998 the focus shifted to the pursuit of the benefits of a peaceful 
nuclear program with indigenous technology. At the same time, she affirms that Brazilian 
diplomats usually take an aggressive stance in the defense of article IV of the NPT, 
because“ like a majority of non-nuclear weapon states, Brazil views the nuclear order as 
an unfair arrangement based on an unfulfilled bargain of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons between “ haves” and “ have nots”, a promise of the 
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five recognized nuclear weapon states to work toward disarmament and of all other 
signatories not to develop nuclear weapons 
118
.”  
Currently, the proliferation of dual use technology is a direct consequence of 
article IV of the NPT. It is clear that every time that a NNWS acquire expertise in the 
mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle it will raise concern in the international community. At 
the same time, the implementation of the safeguards as established in article III depends 
on the NWS commitment to disarmament. The same logic applies to the NPRs: the 
United States continues to use weapons grade uranium in its submarines while its 
diplomacy points out to the fact that the spread of nuclear technology will increase the 




In this regard, my research will look into the Brazilian nuclear-powered 
submarine program and how the lack of regulation concerning NPRs might work as a 
good excuse for a country that is willing to produce weapons grade uranium and resume 
its nuclear weapons program. Since it is an ongoing project, it will be necessary to 
analyze the history of the Brazilian nuclear program, official speeches, documents and 
declarations in order to assess its real intentions. Moreover, in order to confirm the 
hypothesis, it will be necessary to look for any indication in previous researches that 
Brazilian enrichment facilities tried to produce or accumulate HEU.  
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The NPT and the Lack of Regulation Concerning Naval Propulsion Reactors 
(NPRs) 
 
In the book Uranium: War, Energy and the Rock that Shaped the World, Tom 
Zoellner noted that the mineral encompasses the best and the worst in mankind: scientific 
progress and human annihilation are two sides of the same coin. Thus, once it is dug up, 
it can never be reburied again 
119
. Actually, uranium became one of the defining aspects 
of world politics in the 21
st
 century. The NPT somehow recognizes the duality of nuclear 
energy and proposes a grand bargain that rests in three pillars: nonproliferation, peaceful 
use of nuclear energy and disarmament. In order to strike the deal, however, the authors 
of the treaty had to leave a number of nuclear activities in the category of acceptable 
uses, such as peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) for industrial purposes and the 
operation of naval propulsion reactors (NPRs)
120
.  
Aware of the perils of the proliferation of nuclear technology, the NPT not only 
established that NNWS had the inalienable right to develop a peaceful nuclear program in 
article IV but also that they should accept that safeguards be applied to all nuclear 
material used for civilian purposes. According to article III: “each non-nuclear-weapon 
State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to 
be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance 
with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards 
system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations 
assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from 
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peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 
121
.” The NPT, 
however, does not  regulates the production, use and disposition of HEU for naval 
nuclear reactors.  
The lack of regulation in the NPT was purportedly to be commercial and allow 
countries under the treaty to reap the benefits of progress. PNEs, for example, had a 
variety of objectives such as deep seismic sounding; creating underground cavities; 
helping to extract gas and oil; extinguishing burning gas or oil wells; creating reservoirs 
and helping to construct a canal
122
. Despite of its peaceful intentions, the detonation of 
nuclear devices above ground was injecting large quantities of radioactive material into 
the atmosphere and contaminating the environment. According to Benjamin K. Sovacool, 
“ a 104-kiloton detonation at Yucca Flat, Nevada, displaced 12 million tons of soil and 
resulted in a radioactive dust cloud that rose 12,000 feet and plumed toward the 
Mississippi River
123.” With regard to NPRs, Italy and Holland were interested in the use 
of nuclear propulsion in commercial vessels but only the Soviet Union really applied the 
technology to real civilian activities, creating the nuclear icebreakers that are still used in 
the Arctic
124
. Furthermore, other parties involved in the negotiation were interested in the 
advantages of nuclear submarines.  
In 1996 the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) finally 
prohibited the PNEs and closed one important loophole in the NPT. However, the story is 
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different concerning nuclear naval propulsion. The objections presented by both NWS 
and NNWS left NPRs outside of the treaty, which meant that nuclear materials in 
propulsion were not subject to safeguards. According to the IAEA`s former Assistant 
Director General for External Relations David Fischer “ it was generally widely 
recognized that this was a serious loophole in the safeguards prescribed by the treaty
125
.”  
James Clay Moltz stresses that states parties were also fully aware of the dangers 
implied in the lack of regulation because it was likely that other states could block 
inspections by saying that their fissile material was going to be used as fuel for NPRs. In 
this regard, they tried to bring NPRs under safeguards but the result was not satisfying: 
before withdrawing nuclear material from safeguards for non-explosive military use, 
states would have to comply with a series of requirements that prevented its use for a 
nuclear weapon but did not forbid its use for nuclear propulsion. Moltz also affirms that “ 
they (member states) did nothing to remedy the absence in the NPT of any restrictions on 
the transfer of nuclear materials and technology for use in a propulsion reactor.”  
According to Greg Thielmann “under the terms of the NPT, enriched uranium that 
is burned in naval propulsion reactors is not subject to safeguards in either NWS or 
NNWS
126
.” It is always important to highlight the fact that NWS signed reduced versions 
of safeguards agreement as an incentive to non-proliferation, since they were not required 
to do that. As it was established by article III, however, most NNWS negotiated and 
ratified comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA that are applied to all 
nuclear material used for civilian purposes. Thus, basically 100% of their material is 
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under safeguard, because they are not allowed to have nuclear weapons programs. 
Thielmann also stresses that the NPT regulate the use of nuclear material for naval 
propulsion only minimally.  
According to IAEA INFCIRC/153, which establishes the model safeguards 
agreement for the NPT, the nuclear material of state parties is not subject to safeguards as 
long as it is destined for non-proscribed military activities. For nuclear propulsion, 
however, states should comply with three requirements. First of all, IAEA should be 
informed about the activity and during the period of non-application of safeguards the 
nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons; Second, the 
agency and the state should reach an agreement that the material will not be under 
safeguards only while it is being used for such activity. As soon as the material is 
reintroduced into peaceful nuclear activity, safeguards will be reapplied. Finally, 
INFCIRC/153 also states that each arrangement shall be made in agreement with IAEA 
and that such agreements “ shall only relate to the temporal and procedural provisions, 
reporting arrangements, etc., but shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge 
of the military activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein 
127
.”  Greg 
Thielmann concludes that the minimal legal framework and lack of additional 
transparency measures would hinder any possibility of the IAEA to find out that fissile 
material designated for NPRs are being used in nuclear weapons program
128
. 
In conclusion, the NPT is permissive enough with countries enriching uranium for 
NPRs or non-proscribed military activities. In this sense, it is likely that NNWS such as 
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Brazil will accumulate HEU. At the same time it is important to highlight the fact that in 
1991 Brazil and Argentina signed the Guadalajara agreement, which established that the 
two countries were only allowed to develop civilian nuclear programs. It also created the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) 
to oversee the application and management of the Common System for Accounting and 
Control of Nuclear Materials. Despite the fact that the Quadripartite Agreement (Brazil, 
Argentina, ABACC and the IAEA) allows its signatories to withdraw nuclear material for 
propulsion purposes, Brazil`s safeguards agreement is more restrictive than the model 
used for NNWS
129
. On the one hand article 1 of Brazil`s agreement applies safeguards to 
all nuclear material in all nuclear activities 
130
. On the other, INFCIRC/153 refers to 




Naval Propulsion Reactors and the Full Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
 
The world has been facing the perils of dual-use technology since 1954, when 
Obninsk, the first non-military nuclear power station, was commissioned in Russia. Just 
like commercial nuclear reactors, most NPRs run on uranium-235, because uranium-238, 
the most abundant isotope, does not sustain nuclear chain reactions
132
. Since only 0,7% of 
natural uranium is uranium-235, fuel enrichment is a fundamental part of the process: 
most commercial nuclear reactors are fueled with LEU (3,5%) while NPRs can also run 
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run with LEU, HEU and also weapons grade uranium. It is widely recognized that U.S. 
and U.K. are highly dependent on weapons grade uranium for their NPRs. 
Uranium and plutonium can be used as fuel for nuclear reactors, since both of 
them release large amounts of nuclear energy, which is converted into electricity. 
Plutonium, however, decay much more rapidly than uranium isotopes: while the former 
only exist in trace quantities in nature, the latter is much more abundant in the isotope 
uranium-238. Charles D. Fergusson explains that “nuclear reactors, however, make 
plutonium when uranium-238 absorbs neutrons and then undergoes a relatively rapid 
series of radioactive decays to become plutonium-239. Thus, the relatively vast amounts 
of uranium-238 available in mines located in many nations could, in principle, serve as 
fertile material to produce vast amounts of nuclear fuel
133
.” While uranium-235 is called 
a fissile isotope because it easily fissions if it absorbs a neutron of almost any energy, 
uranium-238 is called a fissionable isotope because it has only a relatively small 
probability of fission if it absorbs high energy neutrons 
134
. 
In naval nuclear propulsion, uranium fissions and produces heat to convert water 
into steam, which is used to turn turbines that power the onboard systems and drive the 
propeller 
135
. The mineral is one of the few materials capable of producing heat in a self-
sustained chain reaction. The reactor used in this process is the pressurized water reactor 
(PWR), which is surrounded by multiple layers of shielding materials to protect crew 
members from radiation. As a security measure, PWR designs do not contain enough 
                                                        
133 Ibid., p.02 
134 Charles D Ferguson,  “Proliferation Risks of Nuclear Power Programs,” NTI, December 1, 2007. 




fissile uranium to sustain a prompt critical chain reaction. According to Gheorghe 
Constantin, “ when a neutron causes a Uranium atom to fission, the Uranium nucleus is 
split into parts producing atoms of lower atomic number called fission products. When 
formed, the fission products initially move apart at very high speeds, but they do not 
travel very far (…), before they are stopped within the fuel cladding. Most of the heat 
produced in the fission process comes from stopping these fission products within the 
fuel and converting their kinetic energy into heat 
136
 .”  
Enrichment technologies are necessary to produce the ceramic pellets of uranium 
dioxide (UO2) that will compose the fuel rods that are used to build the core of the 
reactor. In the case of nuclear powered submarines, NPRs can run with different 
enrichment grades. Weapons-grade uranium is defined as a mixture of uranium isotopes 
consisting of more than 90 percent uranium-235, which is more suitable to weapons but it 
is used in American and British nuclear powered submarines as well. Highly enriched 
uranium is defined as consisting of a 20 percent or greater concentration of uranium-235 
and can power explosive chain reactions. The low-enriched uranium, however, is suitable 
for reactors but not for powering bombs and is defined as consisting of greater than 0.72 
percent but less than 20 percent uranium-235 
137
.  
Charles D. Ferguson also highlights the fact that LEU enrichment plant is a latent 
nuclear explosive material factory. The same enrichment technology can be used to make 
either LEU or HEU, since “ a centrifuge enrichment plant could be designed to allow the 
operator to change the connections among the centrifuge units to shift cascades from 
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LEU to HEU production 
138
.” In this regard, it is more complicated for inspectors to 
determine whether an enrichment plant is complying with the requirements of the IAEA. 
Another challenge is that operators could use the LEU product from one pass through the 
plant for another pass through the plant until it reaches the desired concentration of 
uranium-235. Charles D. Ferguson explains that “ only a handful of passes typically four 
or five, are needed to boost LEU to weapon-grade level
139
.”  
Despite the fact that Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) technology has provided 
diesel submarines with the capacity to stay submerged for several weeks instead of 
several days, many countries continue to pursue nuclear propulsion, probably because in 
addition to the advantages of the vessel countries could also invest in the mastery of the 
nuclear fuel cycle. It is estimated, for example, that Brazil will save around US$ 10-12 
million annually by producing its own fuel
140
. Furthermore, as it was aforementioned, the 
NPT permits NNWS to acquire naval propulsion reactors, whose nuclear fuel is enriched 
to a higher percentage and is free from safeguards (non-proscribed military activities). It 
can really be used as an excuse for countries that are willing to secretly develop nuclear 
military capacities. Therefore, nuclear-powered submarine programs pose a real 
challenge to IAEA`s inspection authority. 
 
The Brazilian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Program 
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Brazil`s involvement with nuclear technology began a long time ago, during the 
Manhattan Project, when the country supplied the United States with uranium ore. 
Uranium is found all over the world but only a few countries have it in enough quantities 
to commercially explore it. Brazil, for example, has five percent of the uranium in the 
world 
141
. The country continued to provide raw material until the 1950s, when the 
Brazilian government developed the policy of “ specific compensation”, which 
established that each export of strategic minerals should correspond to a transfer of 
technology.  After many setbacks throughout last decades, Brazil currently mines and 
mills uranium, produces nuclear fuel, operates two nuclear power plants and is building a 
third and last, but not least, finally inaugurated in 2011 the shipyard for constructing 
nuclear submarines using indigenously developed Brazilian technology. 
In order to understand the reasons behind the nuclear-powered submarine 
program it is necessary to bear in mind that “ the quest to develop an indigenously and 
fully independent nuclear program has long been an ambition of Brazilian political, 
scientific, economic and military officials
142
.” Despite the cooperation with the U.S. in 
the context of Atoms for Peace program, which resulted in the first research reactor in 
1957, the Brazilian government always faced United States reluctance concerning the 
transfer of dual-use technology and the supply of new nuclear plants. Therefore, Brazil 
signed an ambitious technology transfer agreement with Germany during the military 
regime: “ on 27 June 1975 the Bonn government made a commitment to transfer at least 
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eight reactors and the full nuclear fuel cycle to Brazil under the international safeguards 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
143
.”  
It is widely believed that due to American pressure, Germany refused to transfer 
the more reliable ultracentrifuge enrichment method and components essential for 
mastering the nuclear fuel cycle. The frustration with the Germans resulted in the creation 
of a secret military program, which was implemented by the three branches of the Armed 
Forces, in the middle of the military dictatorship in Brazil. Carlo Patti affirms that the 
program initially was focused on the production of uranium hexafluoride, but rapidly 
evolved to include “ research into all phases of energy production and the construction of 
a miniature reactor for naval propulsion, and the development of nuclear explosives
144
.” 
In the 1980s, Brazil had indigenously mastered the technology to convert yellow cake 
into pure uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and enrich uranium through the development of the 
ultracentrifuge method by the Brazilian Navy. After twenty one years of military 
dictatorship (1964-1985), the first civilian Brazilian President, Jose Sarney, announced 
that Brazil had reached the capacity of autonomously enriching uranium through a 
nuclear program that had been kept secret for national security reasons 
145
. 
In 1988, the Brazilian Congress approved a new constitution that prohibited all 
nuclear activities except for peaceful purposes
146
. A few years later, in 1990 the first 
president democratically elected by the people after the end of the military dictatorship, 
Fernando Collor de Mello, shut down the Brazilian nuclear military program. During his 
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tenure, Brazil also signed a bilateral agreement with Argentina pledging to use nuclear 
technology only in civilian programs, which was enforced by the Common System of 
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC)
147
. The Brazilian-Argentine 
Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was also created in 
this very same day. Therefore, President Collor de Mello opened the path to the Brazilian 
adherence to the nonproliferation regime, which would only be completed in 1998, 
during the Presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, when the country finally ratified 
the NPT and became a NNWS. The 1990s were marked by an economic slowdown that 
resulted in the closure of the UF6 conversion plant and the suspension of the construction 
of two nuclear power plants: Angra I was commissioned in 1985, Angra II in 2002 and 
the third plant is still under construction. 
The Brazilian nuclear program was only revived after the election of President 
Lula da Silva in 2003, mainly because of his personal commitment to the cause and 
Brazil`s strong economic growth during most of his administration. In 2007, he 
established a Ministerial Committee chaired by the Defense Minister Nelson Jobim to 
devise the National Defense Strategy. In 2008 the document was released with the 
following overarching goals: reorganization of the armed forces; restructuring of the 
Brazilian defense industry while promoting economic development; revising of the 
policies governing the composition of the armed forces
148
. The National Defense Strategy 
also emphasized the two priorities of the Brazilian Navy: the protection of oil platforms 
and the oil producing zones; the defense of waters under Brazilian jurisdiction, especially 
islands, the coastline, rivers and the delta of the Amazon river. 
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The document also intertwined the role of the Navy with the necessity to invest in 
nuclear capability, when it called for Brazil to undertake the following initiatives: 1. To 
further the nuclear powered submarine program, conclude the complete nationalization 
and development of the fuel cycle (including gasification and enrichment) on an 
industrial scale; 2. Ensure that the country has technology for building reactors for its 
exclusive use; 3. Speed up the mapping, prospecting, and utilization of uranium deposits; 
4. Develop the potential for designing and building nuclear thermoelectric power plants 
to be under national control, even if developed through partnerships with foreign states 
and companies; 5. Increase the capacity to use nuclear energy within a broad spectrum of 
activities 
149
. It is also important to stress that the important role played by the navy in the 
nuclear program and in the National Defense Strategy stems from its communication 
strategy, which coined the term Blue Amazon in 2004, connecting Amazon forests and 
Brazil`s sea riches. In 2010, the term, which was well accepted by the public, was 
registered as a trademark 
150
. The National Defense Strategy makes indirect reference to 
the Blue Amazon when it affirms that one of the priorities of the Navy is to protect the 
territorial waters under Brazilian jurisdiction.  
The agreement with France came a few months after the release of the National 
Defense Strategy by the end of 2008, when the two countries finally signed a cooperation 
agreement to develop four conventional and one nuclear-powered submarine. France 
would only provide assistance with developing the non-nuclear components of the 
nuclear-powered submarine, while the NPR was supposed to be built by Brazilian naval 
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engineers. The agreement also contemplated the construction of a submarine base and a 
shipyard in Rio de Janeiro that would be managed by the French private sector, and then 
returned to the Brazilian government in 20 years. In a press conference after the meeting 
with the Brazilian President Lula da Silva, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared 
that the strategic partnership would also include official support to the Brazilian 
aspiration of becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council
151
. 
One of the most important objectives of the Brazilian diplomacy is to engage in the 




The Brazilian submarine project is divided in three different phases
152
. The first 
one was focused on the production and shipment of yellow cake to Canada. In February 
2012, however, the Brazilian Minister for Science and Technology Raul Raupp and the 
Navy Commander Admiral Julio Soares Moura Neto have inaugurated the Hexafluoride 
Production Unit (USEXA) that would produce 40 ton of UF6 a year. That was an 
important step to the Navy nuclear program and to the Brazilian nuclear power plants, 
such as Angra I and II 153. The second phase is based on the construction of naval reactor 
that is already underway, since the Government approved funds in the order of U$ 525 
million to support the project. The last and third phase is related to the construction of the 
submarine itself. 
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The Brazilian Navy already enriches uranium up to 5% at Aramar Experimental 
Center in Ipero. Odair Goncalves, former chairman of Brazil`s National Nuclear Energy 
Commission (Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear, CNEN), said a few years ago that 
Brazil would probably power its submarines with fuel produced from uranium enriched 
to 18-19 percent 
154
.The French and the Chinese Navy are also using LEU in their nuclear 
submarines.  According to specialists, “operations involving enriching uranium up to 
20% could be authorized by the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control 
of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
under special safeguards arrangements
155
.” Kassenova also points out to the fact that the 
Brazilian Navy currently leases uranium enrichment technology to a state-owned 
company overseeing the civilian fuel cycle (Brazilian Nuclear Industries) for use at the 
Nuclear Fuel Factory at Resende. 
The Brazilian nuclear –powered submarine program seems to be part of a broader 
strategy that involves the military protection of the pre-salt layers, one of the biggest oil 
discoveries of the last decades, and also the Brazilian economy and infrastructure. Brazil 
currently does not have the capacity to produce enough enriched uranium to meet its 
needs, so it is obliged to import it from other countries. In this regard, the program would 
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There are no reasons to believe that Brazil is willing to resume its nuclear 
weapons program, even though there is no credible way to assess whether the country is 
accumulating HEU at the moment. However, the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine 
program has potential to pose a threat to the nonproliferation goals of the NPT because 
the spread of nuclear fuel enrichment techniques will result in more virtual nuclear 
powers (VNP`s) across the globe, although that is the price to pay for the spread of dual-
use technology. In addition, it will become harder for the IAEA inspectors to oversee 
uranium production and implement the safeguards when needed. Since Brazil will open 
the precedent it is likely that other countries will follow suit, which might also lead to the 
increase of enriched uranium and plutonium in the world.  
The construction of a nuclear-powered submarine program and the 
nonproliferation regime are not at odds. It is not illegal to invest in non-proscribed 
military activities and it is not illegal to transfer NPR technology. It is undeniable that 
there are perils involved in the lack of safeguards for uranium fuel destined to those 
activities. In the case of Brazil, however, it is clear that the country has enough 
international credibility to carry on this kind of program. From a legal perspective, Brazil 
is a reliable state since it adhered to the nonproliferation regime back in the 1990s. 
Furthermore, the safeguards established by the quadripartite agreement are apparently 
more rigorous that those stated by INFCIRC/153
156
, which are only related to peaceful 
activities. From a geopolitical point of view it is not likely that Brazil will resume a 
nuclear weapons program, which would destabilize the whole region. Even Argentina, 
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the neighbor that is a partner and a rival at the same time, agrees in principle that Brazil 
has the right to pursue an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle
157
.  
The international community was alarmed with the Brazilian nuclear-powered 
submarine because there are different explanations for the program and the Brazilian 
authorities are very secretive about its nature. Togzahn Kassenova affirms that the 
driving forces behind the program can be divided in into the following categories: 
strategic, bureaucratic and technological 
158
. In a nutshell, the military expect to use the 
vessel to defend natural resources and the long Brazilian coastline and also for power 
projection in the South Atlantic. At the same time, the scientific community and the Navy 
expect to develop technology related to uranium enrichment and submarine building. 
From a diplomatic perspective, the program is a matter of prestige for a country that is a 
champion of disarmament and nonproliferation and is pursuing a permanent seat in the 
United Nations Security Council. Usually the rationale for the nuclear program can be 
found scattered over different declarations, official speeches and even newspaper articles.  
NWS should never lose sight that NNWS also want to reap the benefits of 
peaceful nuclear cooperation, the original ideal of the nonproliferation regime that is 
embodied in article IV of the NPT. It is hard to convince a NNWS representative that 
nuclear energy and nuclear propulsion are dangerous toys, only fit for the developed 
countries that are part of the club. Impoverished countries such as Yemen are already 
considering the nuclear alternative as a matter of survival
159
. This is clear when you bear 
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in mind that coal poisons the air, hydroelectric depends on the existence of rivers, natural 
gas is expensive and many countries cannot rely on oil. In the future, it is likely that 
scarce resources will lead poor states to invest more and more in civilian nuclear 
programs. The IAEA will naturally have to deal with the perils behind the proliferation of 
dual use technology and as pointed out by Daphne Morrison “ states like Brazil which 
have mastered the fuel cycle are unlikely to give up their right to pursue enrichment 
technologies
160
.” It was already demonstrated that indigenous nuclear fuel production 
would save the country millions of dollars a year. 
Even if Brazil gives up its nuclear-powered submarine program, the precedent is 
already set and the impression that the current nonproliferation regime promotes 
technology denial is already embedded in the perception of developing countries 
negotiators, officials and dignitaries. In addition, nonproliferation demands placed on 
NNWS are tough while it is clear that progress towards nuclear disarmament is fragile. 
According to the Ministerial Declaration of the International Conference on Nuclear 
Security, in 2013, the U.S. and the United Kingdom “ encourage states to further 
minimize the use of high enriched uranium on a voluntary basis and to use low enriched 
uranium where technically and economically feasible
161
.” At the same time, it is well 
known that the U.S. and U.K are still using HEU and even weapons grade uranium for 
their NPRs. 
International pressure concerning nuclear proliferation may work in specific 
situations, but it is not a panacea. Brazil ratified the NPT in 1998 and renewed its 
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international credentials as a peaceful and recently democratized country in search of 
development and stability. It is not likely, however, that the Brazilian nuclear program 
will be abandoned, even though there is no evidence that Brazil is willing to build atomic 
weapons. The country has too much to lose to resume a military nuclear program that 
would destabilize the only denuclearized region in the world. However, a copycat 
program is popping out in a sensitive region of the globe: the Middle East. For instance, 
Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, head of Iran`s atomic Energy Organization affirmed that “ for 
now we have no plans for enrichment above 20 percent. But in some cases… such as 
ships and submarines, if our researchers have a need for greater presence under the sea, 




In order to guarantee a peaceful future for mankind it is not only necessary to 
regulate the material destined to non-proscribed military activities and enforce the 
safeguards but it is also mandatory that NWS give the example. Even though it is not 
possible to rebury uranium and pretend that the impoverished nations of the world cannot 
benefit from nuclear energy, it is possible to advocate the use of LEU in naval reactors. It 
is also possible and highly recommended that NWS speed up the pace of nuclear 
disarmament. 
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Illicit Nuclear Trade and the Nonproliferation Regime: 




According to George Perkovich, “the difficulty of detecting weapons proliferation 
rises as the overall density of nuclear commerce, training and cooperation increases
163
.” 
After all, nuclear know-how, equipment and fissile material have been spreading around 
the world as a direct consequence of Article IV of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT), which acknowledges the inalienable right of sovereign states to develop and use 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, the same states that benefit from nuclear 
cooperation might also engage in nuclear proliferation networks in order to acquire 
equipment and tacit knowledge to build nuclear weapons. 
In the fight against nuclear proliferation in the past few years, sanctions have 
become a very popular tool of coercive diplomacy, even if their effectiveness in changing 
the calculus of target states remains highly contested. As of November 2012, President 
Barack Obama declared that the U.S. had imposed the toughest sanctions in history and 
that they were having an impact on Iran`s economy
164
. For many different reasons, 
sanctions have been setting the tone of the bilateral relations between U.S. and Iran since 
1979, when they were imposed for the first time in response to the hostage crisis. 
 Currently, sanctions are linked primarily to the concerns over the country`s 
nuclear acitivities. However, according to the final report of the Panel of Experts 
established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010), issued on June 2012, sanctions are 
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slowing the ability of Iran to expand some aspects of its fuel cycle activities. It continues, 
however, to seek items through illicit procurement to support its prohibited nuclear and 
ballistic missile programs. Apparently, sanctions are able to slow down nuclear programs 
but they do not prevent the engagement of nuclear proliferant states in illicit nuclear 
trade.  
The spread of technological know-how and manufacturing capabilities in the past 
decades had a major impact on the nuclear weapons and missile programs of several 
developing countries, which are able to support one another directly at the state-to-state 
level or indirectly through private sector supplier networks. The development of these 
networks of second-tier proliferators will ultimately undermine the nonproliferation 
regime, as developing countries create indigenous nuclear weapons and delivery systems 
technologies, increasingly disconnecting from first-tier state or corprate suppliers, and 
trade among themselves for the capabilities that their individual programs lack
165
. 
In relation to Iran`s ongoing illicit nuclear and missile procurements, the Iranian 
President Hassan Rouhani recently declared that “of course we bypass sanctions. We are 
proud that we bypass sanctions because the sanctions are ilegal
166
.” In addition, the head 
of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI), Ali Akbar Salehi, acknowledged that 
Iran has indeed purchased nuclear or nuclear-related components from other countries
167
.  
Interestingly, in August 2013 the AEOI held expositions on the nuclear program, which 
included a display specifically showcasing and complaining about goods used in its 
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nuclear facilities that were allegedly sabotaged by Western governments and many of 
these goods were obtained illegally, according to specialists
168
. 
In the first part of the paper I will look into how illicit nuclear trade challenges the 
nonproliferation regime. Apparently, illicit nuclear trade has been a common response of 
states facing international efforts to block their access to acquire unconventional weapons 
and their means of delivery. The Iranian and North Korean nuclear and missile programs 
are based on military goods  and sensitive technologies obtained from the international 
marketplace in breach of national export controls and sanctions. Daniel Salisbury 
highlights the fact that the history of international attempts to control sensitive 
technologies is cyclical: “shocks to the system, tightening of certain controls in response, 




In order to assess the impacts of sanctions on illicit nuclear trade in North Korea 
and Iran, I rely on the following documents: UN North Korea Sanctions Panel Report, 
released on June 2013
170
; UN Iran Sanctions Panel Report, released on June 2014
171
. 
North Korea has set a dangerous example: it benefited from peaceful nuclear 
proliferation, became a virtual nuclear power (VNP), withdrew from the NPT and built 
nuclear weapons. Furthermore, North Korea has Always been deeply involved in illicit 
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nuclear trade, which might confirm that the source of nuclear knowledge may have 
shifted from first-tier advanced industrialized states to second-tier developing industrial 
states, which are more likely to resort to proliferation networks in order to obtain wares 
for their nuclear weapons programs.  
In the past decades, dense networks of second-tier proliferators such as Iran, 
North Korea and formerly Libya in connection with the A.Q. Khan network have been 
speeding up proliferation and lowering technological barriers
172
. As the primary 
recipients of nuclear technology of the Pakistani network, the three countries were 
considered by the U.S as rogue states committed with nuclear proliferation
173
. In this 
sense, it will be necessary to investigate how the Iranian nuclear program has been 
reacting to sanctions in the third part of the paper. If Iran`s pattern of behavior resembles 
the North Korean one, the country will probably take over the central role of spreading 
nuclear and missile technologies, especially because of its advanced nuclear missile and 
nuclear program.  
Finally, analysts have pointed out that the future of illicit trade may include a 
pariah country, unauthorized entities in a country or even “rogue suppliers,” criminal 
elements selling nuclear capabilities to other states
174
. As a rogue supplier, North Korea 
has demonstrated the capability and inclination to provide nuclear goods to customers, 
bypassing export controls and UN Sanctions
175
. In this sense, it is possible that Iran 
emerge as a rogue supplier as well, which will certainly complicate current nuclear talks. 
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Literature review  
 
The discovery of A.Q Khan proliferation network brought into attention the role 
of illicit nuclear trade in the spread of nuclear, chemical , biological weapons and also 
their delivery systems
176
. Alexander H. Montgomery  points out to the fact that “like the 
demand-side question of why states seek weapons, the supply-side question of where 
states try to get needed materials from is significantly affected by efforts of powerful 
actors to limit access to nuclear technologies
177
”. In this sense, in order to assess how Iran 
and North Korea currently affect illicit nuclear trade, it is important to fully understand 
the structure of proliferation networks and the impact of sanctions in the nuclear calculus 
of both countries. 
Since the creation of the United Nations, the Security Council has been resorting 
to sanctions as coercive enforcement tool in order to prevent the breach of international 
law, to maintain world peace and security and for implementation of its decisions. 
Especially after the end of the Cold War, “increased economic interdependence, the 
desire to avoid the costs of military action, and increased international collaboration 
through the United Nations have made sanctions a striking option for states wanting to 
coerce other states short of war
178
.” According to the Security Council Sanctions 
Committee, the United Nations may impose comprehensive economic and trade sanctions 
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and /or more targeted measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, financial or 
diplomatic restrictions. 
Once defined as economic weapons used to wage a nonmilitary campaign, 
extending the diplomatic process beyond verbal negotiations, scholars and policymakers 
have been discussing the effectiveness of sanctions in altering the policy direction of 
target states for a long time
179
. Since the 1960s and 1970s the debate has been oscillating 
between those who see sanctions as effective non-military instruments of coercion and 
those who claim that the effects of sanctions in policy direction are exaggerated
180
. 
Despite the fact that pessimists have formed the larger group, claiming that sanctions are 
not effective, there is a widespread belief that sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating 
table over its nuclear activities, even though its nuclear program remains active and the 
country is engaged in illicit nuclear trade. 
The emergence of nuclear proliferation networks in the developing world is a new 
challenge that might undermine the effectiveness of sanctions and also the 
nonproliferation regime. The source of nuclear knowledge shifted from first-tier 
developed countries to second-tier developing countries that might be willing to support 
each others nuclear programs. In addition, developing countries have a poor record of 
implementing trade controls and sanctions and an increasing ability to manufacture 
reliable dual-use components. In this sense, sanctions were never adopted universally or 
applied effectively due to the inexistence of efficient export control regimes, which is an 
example of supply-side measures adopted by first-tier nuclear supplier countries. 
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Therefore, proliferant states will continue seeking capabilities for their nuclear programs 
from an abundance of suppliers and intermediaries in the developing world
181
. 
Basically, there are two reasons that explain the emergence of nuclear 
proliferation networks: the will to build nuclear weapons and the impossibility of 
obtaining the required goods legitimately and/or legally
182
. If a strong demand from some 
states has always been the driving force behind proliferation, the structure designed to 
satisfy this demand is new. It is also important to stress that these networks benefit from 
the increase in worldwide trade flows in recent years coupled with the emergence of 
suppliers capable and willing to transfer sensitive technology to potential purchasers. The 
North Korean ballistic trade, for example, is usually believed to provide Pyongyang with 
between 500 million and one billion dollars annually
183
. 
Proliferation networks can have three diferent structures: rings, stars and cliques. 
As rings or circles, the connections between nodes form a circle. As a star, every node is 
connected through a central hub. The cliques are a much denser network in which each 
node is directly connected to every other node. In order to understand the strucutre of 
nuclear proliferation networks, it is important to bear in mind that nuclear weapons 
programs require tacit knowledge, which is a kind of knowledge that cannot be 
formulated in words or symbols, but must be learned through trial-and-error processes
184
. 
Tacit knowledge will make nuclear proliferation networks resemble stars, rather than 
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rings or cliques, while missile networks are more likely to become cliques much faster, 
because missile technology seems to be more transferable than nuclear technology.  
In the first-tier missile proliferation network, Russia and China prevailed as the 
main hubs, sharing technology with four states: Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Syria. In 
relation to the second-tier ballistic missile proliferation network, it is interesting to notice 
that only the core second-tier proliferators are part of the group. Differently from first-tier 
transactions, however, the structure resembles more of a clique, instead of a star, due to 
the fact that relationships are more reciprocal. Three of the four core missile proliferators 
who received technology from both China and Russia later developed links between each 
other, such as Syria, Iran and North Korea. North Korea received early assistance from 
Egypt (1974-1981) and Iran (1988). Libya and Syria assisted Iran early in its program, 
which was subsequently reciprocated. 
Existing  ballistic missile and nuclear proliferation networks closely resemble 
stars and North Korea and Pakistan are the hubs or central nodes for each network
185
. The 
missile networks, however, resemble more of a clique than does the nuclear network but 
only Iran and North Korea form the hubs
186
. Since A.Q. Kahn enjoyed autonomy under 
the Pakistani government, it is also possible to affirm that Pakistan became the central 
hub of a nuclear proliferation network that transfered  plans or parts to Iran, Lybia and 
North Korea and possibly offered assistance to countries such as Iraq and Syria. North 
Korea forms the center of a missile proliferation network and transfered technology to 
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Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lybia, Pakistan, and Syria. Iran forms a smaller hub for missiles sales, 
which used to connect Libya, North Korea and Syria
187
. 
Finally, Alexander Montgomery affirms that if the North Korean and the 
Pakistani hubs are effectively shut down, the next step would be to turn nodes that could 
evolve into new hubs. In this sense, the advanced state of Iran`s missile and nuclear 
programs, as well as its participation in both networks, suggest that the country is the 





Illicit Nuclear Trade Networks Components and Methodology 
 
Analysts affirm that states such as Iran, North Korea and Pakistan are currently 
involved with illicit procurement networks. The main objective of illicit nuclear trade is 
to procure nuclear direct-use and dual-use goods, many of which are controlled by 
national and international trade control regimes
189
. Illicit nuclear trade depends on 
network made up of an interacting collection of companies and individuals engaged in 
the process of procuring nuclear goods or capabilities. As aforementioned, a network is a 
collection of nodes that can represent a company, a person, or a state procurement 
organization. A node with many connections is considered to be a hub. 
According to David Albright, networks of traffickers, suppliers and trading 
companies are connected by requests for price, quotes, orders, shipments, payments, and 
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other communications and transactions
190
. This paper also follows his definition of illicit 
nuclear trade, which is a trade that is not authorized by: “1) the state in which it 
originates; 2) under international law; 3) the states through which it transits; or 4) the 
state to which it is imported
191
.”  




 A state nuclear program or complex which compiles lists of needed goods; 
 A domestic nuclear procurement organization which receives the lists of needed 
equipment from the state nuclear program and organizes their procurement 
domestically and abroad; 
 Often domestic front of trading companies working under contract for the nuclear 
procurement organization to obtain goods; 
 Other front or trading companies or middlemen/brokers usually located abroad 
and further removed from the nuclear procurement organization, which are hired 
by the domestic front or trading company or the nuclear procurement organization 
for the purpose of placing orders for goods; 
 Supppliers of goods; 
 Intermediaries involved in shipping and logistics; 
 Banks, financial institutions, or informal payment structures which wittingly or 
unwittingly facilitate financing for the goods. 
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Countries that are deeply involved in illicit nuclear trade operate using some of these 
network components. The analysis of the UN North Korea Sanctions Panel Report and 
the UN Iran Sanctions Panel Report will show whether sanctions are preventing 
proliferant states from using them.  
 
The Nonproliferation Regime and the Challenges of Illicit Nuclear Trade 
 
According to Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba, the nuclear programs of North 
Korea, Iran and Pakistan pose a real threat to the nonproliferation regime because they 
reinforce the risk of latent proliferation, in which countries adhere to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) but also try to develop nuclear weapons capability
193
. In 
the long run Iran can either continue as nonnuclear weapons state (NNWS) under the 
NPT or follow North Korea`s path and withdraw from the treaty.  
Currently, second-tier nuclear proliferation also presents an unprecedented 
challenge to the nonproliferation regime because the spread of technological know-how 
and manufacturing capabilities is wider than hitherto believed and might engender more 
Virtual Nuclear Powers (VNPs). Second-tier proliferators might be defined as developing 
states - or private companies within those states - that may be supplying nuclear 
weapons-relevant material on the international market. In this sense, developing countries 
are trading nuclear technology, weapons designs and delivery systems among themselves 
to improve one another`s nuclear efforts. Therefore, technology transfer among 
proliferating states will cut the cost of and the period to acquisiton of nuclear weapons 
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Latent proliferation started decades ago as a colateral effect of the article IV of the 
NPT, which recognized the inalienable right of all the parties to develop research, 
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The result was the 
emergence of the so-called VNPs, which are able to develop nuclear weapons but stop 
before assembling them. Thus, initially nuclear weapons-relevant material spread from 
states or privates entities within states that are members of the formal nuclear exporters 
groups, the Nuclear Exporters Committee (or Zangger Committee) or the NSG
195
. 
The Khan network posed one of the most serious challenges to the 
nonproliferation regime since it was responsible for the most dangerous expansion of 
nuclear weapons technology over the past decades. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of the 
Pakistani nuclear bomb, and his associates were able to spread nuclear weapons 
technology for more than two decades by exploiting weaknesses in export control 
systems and recruting suppliers
196
. The Khan network started as an illicit procurement 
network aimed at supplying Pakistan`s gas centrifuge program and after a few years 
turned into a transnational illegal network that also exported gas centrifuges and 
production capabilities and designs for nuclear weapons to countries such as Iran, Iraq, 
Libya and North Korea. Khan has also offered aid to Egypt and Syria. 
David Albright and Corey Hinderstein affirm that “the network adapted and 
benefited from the discriminatory and voluntary export control regime that was embodied 
                                                        
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid, p.01. 
196 David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Unravelling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation 
Networks,” The Washington Quarterly 28, no 2, 2005, pp. 111-128. 
 86 
in the NSG and complementary export control system
197
. South Africa and Turkey, for 
example, were NSG members and did not adequately implement their national export 
control and nuclear nonproliferation laws. In this sense, companies based in NSG 
member countries were able to assist the network and receive items from other NSG 
members essentially without checks on their potential use. States that were outside the 




The creation of the NSG in 1974 is an example of shocks in the nonproliferation 
regime leading to increased efforts to control sensitive nuclear technology. The group 
was created after India tested its atomic weapon in order to contribute to the 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of guidelines for nuclear 
exports and nuclear-related exports.
199
 By that time, nations already signatories of the 
NPT were trying to limit the export of nuclear equipment, materials and technology. In 
addition to more restrictive controls, non-NPT and non-Zangger Commitee nations could 
also participate in the NSG. In order to conduct its first nuclear test, India used plutonium 
produced in a Canadian-origin reactor and heavy water produced in the U.S.  
In 1991, the discovery of Iraq`s procurement efforts also led to the creation of a 
list of dual –use items to supplement the original trigger list of more sensitive items. 
Iraq`s clandestine nuclear efforts in the early 1990s were another important shock to 
nonproliferation regime, which compelled the 40-plus states on the IAEA`s board of 
governors to acknowledge that its safeguards system needed to be strengthened. The 
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immediate outcome after years of negotiaton was the creation of a new model of 
safeguards in 1997, the so-called Additional Protocol (AP), which was codified by IAEA 
information circular 540 (INFCIRC/540). The AP represents greater intrusion into a 
country`s sovereignty than does IAEA safeguards regime (INFCIRC/153). 
According to the new guidelines established by the AP, states should notify the 
IAEA of plans to build new nuclear facilities, to provide blueprints in advance, to declare 
nuclear fuel-cycle related research and development activities, and to require reports on 
all trade in sensitive nuclear technology and materiel. In addition, the AP also grants 
IAEA inspectors greater access to nuclear facilities on short notice and allows them to 
take environmental samples to better detect possible violations
200
. As it is explained by 
the IAEA, “ while the chief object of safeguards under INFCIRC/153 is to verify that 
declared nuclear material was not diverted,  the chief objective of the new measures 
under INFCIRC/540 is to obtain assurance that the State has no undeclared activities
201
.” 
As of December 31, 2014 124 states have implemented the AP. However, many 
states entitled to nuclear cooperation have been systematically refusing to implement the 
protocol, such as: Argentina; Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and 
Venezuela. Iran is an interesting case because the country adhered to the AP in December 
18, 2003 but it never really came into force in the Iranian legal system
202
. Most of the 
time the refusal to implement the AP is more of a political statement than a proof of ill 
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intent. Most developing countries will not accept any further commitment under the 
nonproliferation treaty without much more reliable commitments to nuclear disarmament. 
The U.S, the European Union, Turkey, Australia, South Korea and other states have also 
proposed that the providers of nuclear technology and materiel in the 45-member NSG 




The right of withdrawal of the NPT as acknowledged by article X is an Achilles 
heel of the nonproliferation regime. It can render the whole safeguards regime and even 
the AP ineffective when a country is dead set on nuclear proliferation. On January 2003, 
North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT based on article X, alleging that it 
was being threatened by the U.S. and its allies. Article X guarantees the right of 
withdrawal from the treaty when a country provides the Security Council with three 
months`notice of its intention and also a statement of the extraordinary events it regards 
as having jeopardized its supreme interests. In a statement carried on KCNA, the North 
Korea`s oficial News agency, the government explained “though we pull out of the NPT, 
we have no intention of producing nuclear weapons and our nuclear acitivities at this 
stage will be confined only to peaceful purposes, such as the production of electricity
204
.” 
Three years later, on October 2009, the country conducted its first nuclear test. 
In April 2004, right after the unmasking of A.Q. Khan network, the United 
Nations Security Council issued the Resolution 1540 (UNSCR/1540) in order to prevent 
the emergence of similar proliferation rings and the acquisition of chemical, biological, 
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radiological, and nuclear weapons by terrorist groups. In this sense, UNSCR 1540 closes 
gaps in the nonproliferation regime and establishes three primary obligations for all 
United Nations member states: prohibit support to non-state actors seeking WMD and 
their means of delivery; adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting activities involving 
the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery to non-state actors; and have and 
enforce effective measures to reduce the vulnerability of many legitimate activities to 
misuse in ways that would foster the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery to 
non-state actors
205
. As it was pointed out by George Perkovich, however, “a nuclear order 
based on a double standard – a handful of states determined to keep nuclear weapons and 
also trying to prevent 185 from getting them – is inherently unstable
206
.” 
As became clear from the implementation of UNSCR/1540 there is a gap between 
the language on paper and the reality on the ground, especially in relation to export 
controls. Trade controls are responsibility of states and need strengthening because 
nuclear export controls are not well developed and not capable of effectively controlling 
global trade proliferation of sensitive goods, software and technology
207
. Hitherto, 
nuclear proliferation networks have benefited from both first and second-tier proliferation 
and export control regimes are examples of supply-side measures that first-tier nuclear 
supppliers have adopted
208
. The challenge now is to extend these regime in order to 
capture second-tier exporters as well. 
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The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is also worth mentioning as an 
important example of supply-side measure that not only addresses first-tier but also 
second-tier proliferation states. In 2003, President George W. Bush launched the 
initiative that brought together eleven nations to agree to practical steps to interdict 
shipments of missiles, chemical and biological agents, and nuclear components traveling 
through their national territories. It is important to highlight the fact that Germany and 
Italy interdicted and seized centrifuges parts aboard the BBC China, a German-owned 
ship bound for Lybia that originated in Malaysia, via Dubai
209
. 
As aforementioned, sanctions have also become a popular instrument of coercive 
diplomacy, especially against proliferant countries. In this sense, the nuclear and missile 
programs of Iran and North Korea provide a continuing reminder of the importance of 
preventing illicit trade in proliferation-sensitive technologies
210
. Unfortunately, however, 
according to August 2013 UN Panel of experts final report on the implementation of 
sanctions on Iran,  the country “ (...) continues to seek  items for its prohibited activities 
from abroad by using multiple and increasingly complex procurement methods, including 
front companies, intermediaries, false documentation and new routes.” Apparently, Iran 
is already following North Korea`s path. After years of sanctions, the volume of North 
Korea`s arms sales increased by 20% in 2012. The Panel of Experts report issued on June 
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11, 2013  concluded that the imposition of UN sanctions has not halted North Korea`s 
nuclear program but delayed its timetable
211
.  
In spite of all the efforts, nuclear proliferant states are always one step ahead. The 
same variables that undermine the effectiveness of the nonproliferation regime might also 
render sanctions against Iran and North Korea unsuccessful. After all, the full 
development of second-tier proliferation countries that are able to produce material and 
help each others nuclear efforts coupled with lax export controls might incentivize VNPs 
with nuclear ambitions to cut free from the nonproliferation regime. In addition, sanctions 
cripple countries` economies, which also make nuclear black markets attractive as an 
important source of income.  
 
UN Sanctions Against North Korea  
 
Even though the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the case of 
North Korea (DPRK) is a goal universally accepted by the international community, all 
measures adopted hitherto were unsuccessful
212
. In addition to have constructed a nuclear 
arsenal, North Korea has also declared that it had diversified  its precision nuclear strike 
means and that the U.S. was within the range of its strategic rocket and atomic 
weapons
213
. After almost one decade of sanctions, the country continues to affirm that it 
is simultaneously pursuing economic development and nuclear weapons capability. 
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In order to assess the effectiveness of sanctions it is important to bear in mind that 
North Korea established its illicit nuclear procurement networks in the 1970s. The 
country relied on a network of expatriates and agents that traveled around the world to 
acquire the necessary items to support their nuclear program, which also used goods and 
services provided by Russia, China and Pakistan. Jack Boureston and James A. Russell 
highlighted the fact that in addition to using embassies located in industrial places, the 
North Korean networks also “ (...) created fronts such as phony companies, education 
institutions, and nonprofit organizations to conceal procurement activities, and they 




In July 2006, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1695 (UNSCR 1695) 
required all member states to prevent trade with North Korea in missile technology
215
. In 
the aftermath of North Korea`s nuclear test of October 9, 2006 the United Nations 
Security Council adopted unanimously United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718. 
It was passed under Chapter VII, article 41 of the UN Charter, and imposes a series of 
economic and comercial sanctions on North Korea. Since then, international community 
has been imposing broad sanctions on the country and continued to strengthen the scope 
of actions. In this regard, UNSCR 1718 was followed by resolution 1874, in 2009, 2087, 
in January 2013, and 2094, in march 2013. However, the level of cooperation and the 
scope of implementation varies from state to state. 
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Apparently, North Korea`s trade turnover hit a record high with an increase of 
7.8% from the previous year in 2013, and China was the key contributor to this increase 
with US$ 6.5 billion
216
. The volume of North Korea`s arms sales increased by 20 percent 
in 2012 and in 2013 the country has engaged in US$ 11 million of arms trade in 2013, 
comprised of multiple launch rockets and missiles
217
. Kim Jina also explains that “indeed, 
exports of of ballistic missiles to Egypt, Syria, Iran and Myanmar drew attention from 
international observers; and anti-tank guided missiles in particular showing up in the 
Middle East reveal North Korea`s involvement in the arms trafficking market
218
.”  
UN sanctions are not meant to hamper all economic activities but it is important 
to notice that China and Russia, two permanent members of the UN Security Council, are 
the main contributors to North Korea`s foreign trade turnover. Due to the lack of 
transparency in North Korea`e economy, it is almost impossible to differentiate legitimate 
from illegitimate businesses.  In 2013, North Korea`s trade with China accounted for 89.1 
percent of total trade while North Korea`s trade with its second-largest partner Russia 
surged to US$ 104 million, up 37.3 percent from the previous year
219
. Interestingly, 
North Korea is using rubles instead of dollars in its bilateral trade with Russia. Therefore, 
the country is currently allowed to open accounts in Russian banks and bypass certain 
financial obstacles imposed by the sanctions
220
. 
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The Panel of Experts report issue on March 6, 2014 pointed out that it is hard to 
determine if the level of illicit trade has decreased or increased because not all 
inspections and seizures are immediately reported to the Sanctions Committee
221
. In 
addition to being involved in services or assistance related to manufacture, maintenance 
or use of arms, North Korea is also using multiple and tiered circumvention techniques. 
The investigation on foreign sourced-items found in the Unha-3 long-range rocket debris 
shows that off-the-shelf items or items just below parameters were assembled
222
. The 
Panel also investigated shipments of prohibited items bound for Myanmar, Syria, Eritrea 
and possible arms-related cooperation with Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda and Iran
223
.  
It is clear that North Korea is also redirecting trade to non-sanctioning nations  
and also advancing techniques of sanctions evasion via third countries with lax export 
controls. Kim Jina explains that such techniques include: “ false description and 
mislabeling of cargo; physical concealment measures of the cargo to deceive inspections; 
falsification of the information concerning the original consignor and ultimate consignee; 
multiple layers of middlemen obscuring the actual originator of the cargo and its end-
user; and multiple trans-shipments
224
.”  
In addition to North Korea`s technique of sanctions evasion, uneven 
implementation by UN members states is also a problem that undermines the 
effectiveness of coercive measures approved by the UNSC. The key to effective 
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sanctions depends on the capacity of member states to enforce measures approved by UN 
resolutions. Usually, European countries show a higher level of compliance due to a 
norm-abiding culture and the fact that the European Union adopted  Council Regulations 
concerning restrictive measures against North Korea to ensure uniform application by all 
EU member states. In contrast, a significant number of member states in Asia take a 
minimalist approach to sanctions and North Korea utilizes some Southeast Asian ports as 
routes of transporting prohibited items.
225
. The most traditional illicit trade hubs, for 
example, are the United Arab Emirates (UAE), China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, 




In June 2013, the UN North Korea Sanctions Panel released its final report on the 
implementation of sanctions on North Korea. According to the report, North Korea 
continues to circumvent UN sanctions in order to supply its WMD programs, import and 
export conventional arms, and import luxury goods, which is banned by UNSCR 1718 in 
2006
227
. The 2013 panel report also highlights developments in North Korea`s nuclear 
and missile programs over the past year. Those were the main incidents of alleged non-
compliance in relation to the prohibitions on imports and exports of sensitive 
technologies to North Korea
228
: 
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- Interdiction of a shipment of missile-related items believed to be in transfer from North 
Korea to Syria via China. The goods included “fine grain graffite” cylinders which were 
falsely declared to be lead pipes
229
; 
- Attempt to acquire intangibles relating to missile technology by North Korean officials 
in Ukraine. The information was held in photographs of a secret academic thesis and 
related to new forms of technological processes for design of missile systems, liquid-




- Interdiction of the shipment of Transported Erector Launchers (TELs) to North Korea 
by a Chinese entity
231
.  




UN Sanctions Against Iran 
 
The current Iranian nuclear and missile programs are based significantly on goods 
obtained from the international marketplace in breach of national export controls or 
sanctions. Just like North Korea, Iran has also been trying to benefit from the willingness 
of private firms and lax export controls of certain countries to enable a breach of the arms 
embargoes put in place by Resolution 1929 in 2010 
233
. In spite of the potent barrage of 
unilateral and multilateral sanctions, Iran continues to drive illicit procurement networks, 
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creating state-sponsored procurement networks that seek to hide the true purpose of 




Iran has a long history of engagement in illicit nuclear trade. In 1987, it became 
the Khan network`s second client after Pakistan when it purchased a set of centrifuge 
blueprints, a nuclear weapon design blueprint and sample pieces of obsolete equipment 
from the Pakistani program
235
. Iran`s procurement network is sophisticated, involving the 
top tiers of government, universities, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) 
and also institutions outside of formal state control, such as the bonyads – special 
cooperative corporations that are responsible for a large segment of the Iranian economy 
and manage groups of companies with offices within Iran and around the world. 
In the national Iranian procurement system, the IRGC uses Iran`s Defense 
Industrial Organization (DIO) and its subsidiaries, some universities, and the bonyads in 
order to acquire dual-use nuclear technology in countries such as Japan and Germany. In 
the Iranian procurement attempts abroad, it is common to use of diplomatic personnel to 
make contacts, front companies, falsified end-user certificates to conceal end users and 
middlemen to contact suppliers
236
. The nuclear-related material acquired by Iran in the 
past few decades also include high-strength aluminum and steel, electron beam and 
welders, balancing machines, vacuum pumps, computer-numerically controlled (CNC) 
machine tools and flow-forming machines to whole centrifuges and uranium conversion 
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. Apparently, Iran may even have invested in foreign companies to facilitate its 
procurement needs, such as the Rio Tinto-Zinc mining company in Namibia
238
. 
Iran has been targeted by U.S. sanctions since 1979 but the 2002 revelations 
regarding undeclared nuclear activities fundamentally changed the international political 
and diplomatic debate around the necessity to use coercive diplomacy in order to change 
policy-direction. Thus, in 2005 the increasing international concern regarding Iran`s work 
on uranium enrichment, combined with the IAEA finding that Iran was in breach of its 
nuclear safeguards obligations under the nonproliferation regime, prompted the UN to 
impose a first round of sanctions through Security Council Resolution 1737.
239
 
Afterwards, more restrictive measures have been approved by the UNSC to impede the 
progress of Iran`s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In this regard, UNSCR 1737 
was followed by the imposition of resolutions 1747, in 2007, 1803, in 2008, and 1929, in 
2010.  
In addition to increasingly vigorous and wide-ranging sanctions, the U.S. has also 
used its leverage over the international financial system to create the most comprehensive 
unilateral sanctions regime in history, which also convinced the European Union to 
implement its own set of unilateral sanctions
240
. According to Ali Vaez and Sadjadpour, 
2012 “ was the most tumultuous period for the Iranian economy since 1994, when an 
external debt crisis triggered a major recession. In one calendar year, GDP per capita 
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declined by nearly 8 percent; inflation increased by over 10 percent and unemployment 
inched close to 20 percent
241
.” Furthermore, Hassan Rouhani`s election as president 
might have indicated a change in Iran`s domestic politics. At least the country was able to 
resume the nuclear talks with the P5+1. 
Despite the clear economic slowdown, Trita Parsi affirms that no data suggests 
that Iran`s nuclear program has been affected since the last round of sanctions was 
approved in 2010. On the contrary, the program appears at best entirely unaffected by the 
sanctions because escalating them as  a bargaining chip also gives Iran the incentive to 
advance its program for the same reason
242
. According to Parsi`s interview with elements 
in the current Iranian government, the continuation and acceleration of the nuclear 
program in response to sanctions served three purposes: “ convincing the UNSC that 
sanctions are futile; raising the cost for the West`s alleged refusal to deescalate the 
conflict; and compelling the West to accept Iran`s right to enrich uranium
243
.”  
On 11 June 2014, the UN`s Panel of experts established pursuant to UNSCR 1929 
(2010), released its 2013-2014 report showing that Iran has been breaching sanctions by 
procuring both controled and non-controled items. Interestingly, the report highlights the 
fact that sanctions have played an important role in constraining Iran`s nuclear effort. 
However, it states that the recent decrease in detected cases could be a result of better 
concealment
244
. The 2013-2014 report contains details of several illicit procurement 
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attempts, which were subject to interdiction. It is important to stress, however, that there 
is not enough information to connect the case with a nuclear or missile effort specifically. 
The report also concluded that China must improve the implementation of 
nonproliferation measures, because it is a frequently source of technology interdicted en 
route to Iran. 
Those were the main illicit procurement attempts conducted by Iran in the breach 
of the last round of sanctions imposed by the UNSC
245
: 
- Interdiction of 720 kg (1800 bobbins) of Carbon fibre manufactured in Japan and 
shipped via China. Iran has been working to introduce centrifuges that are constructed 
from carbono fibre for a long time, because its indigenous production is not capable of 
producing high-quality grades. 
 
- Interdiction of 7600 kg shipment of aluminum 70705T0 in rod form en route to Iran 
from China. The material was supposed to be used in Iran`s IR1 centrifuge. 
 
- Interdiction of 670 inverters that were stopped en route to Iran from China. According 
to experts they could be used to operate in the frequency range required by Iranian 
centrifuges. 
 
- Interdiction of 7000 stainless steel bellows on route to Iran from China.  
 





- Interdiction of a cold pilger machine en route to Iran from China. This kind of machine 
is usually used to produce pressure tubes for a heavy water reactor, such as that under 
construction at Arak. 
 
- Interdiction of aluminum grade 2024T3 and cylinder internal diameter 270 mm en route 
to Iran from China. There is no further information about it but this material is usually 
considered to be a missile-related good. 
 
- Interdiction by Israeli authorities of a shipment of rockets, mortars and ammunition that 
were being exported by Iran. 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of both UN reports on the implementation of sanctions on Iran and 
North Korea corroborate the theory that latent proliferation and proliferation networks 
represent two major and broad challenges to the survival of the NPT
246
. In addition, it 
also provides evidence that the sanctions regime alone is failing to prevent the 
engagement of nuclear proliferant states in illicit nuclear trade. Furthermore, proliferation 
networks exacerbate the latent proliferation challenge and illustrate the inadequacy of 
current export controls, especially in developing world countries. Thus, the full 
development of proliferation networks will ultimately render export control regimes 
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It is important to highlight the fact that Iran and North Korea utilizes similar 
methods in order to acquire illicit goods for their respective nuclear programs. The 
cooperation with A.Q. Khan network in the past helped them to speed up their programs 
and establish a list of needed goods. Moreover, both governments rely on domestic 
procurement organizations, which are responsible for their procurement domestically and 
abroad. Both UN reports also show that expandable middlemen located abroad are hired 
to take care of placing orders, shipping and logistics. It is also clear that North Korea and 
Iran use dipomatic personnel for research and purchase of dual-use components. Of the 
UN Security Council states, China and Russia remain important financing nodes for 
North Korean and Iranian proliferation activities because of their failure to fully 
implement UN resolutions. 
Many developing countries have a poor history of implementing trade controls 
and UN sanctions because of a culture of indifference to stopping the spread of sensitive 
nuclear technology
248
. Lax export controls are a reality in many countries in Asia, where 
private companies – usually considered to be the first line of defense against illicit 
nuclear trade – often do not question the buyer or the purpose of the declared end use. In 
addition to the lack of regulation, nuclear proliferation networks also target developing 
states because of their increasing ability to manufacture reliable nuclear and nuclear 
related dual-use components. It is interesting to notice, for example, that Taiwan and 
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South Korea have been failing to prevent smugglers from acquiring controlled goods for 
Iran or North Korea
249
. 
Despite the fact that proliferant states such as India, Pakistan and Iran and former 
proliferant states such as Argentina may resist reforms in trade control systems and 
rigorous enforcement of trade control laws, it is China, a NWS under the NPT that also 
participates in the Zangger Comittee and the NSG, that poses special challenges to 
stopping illicit trade in nuclear and nuclear-related commodities. It is possible to infer 
from the reports, for example, that the country is usually involved in the shipment of 
illicit goods en route to Iran and North Korea. The situation will probably get worse in 
five to ten years because Chinese companies will be able to manufacture goods for use in 
sensitive nuclear facilities, including gas centrifuge plants. 
Despite the fact that China does not make enough higher quality goods in 
sufficient quantities, most of the illicit trade in China involves private Chinese 
companies. Proliferant states usually resort to them when they need higher quality goods 
for their nuclear facilities. Therefore, it is widely believed that increasing privatization in 
China will increase illicit trade due to the lack of adequate scrutiny of their exports. Iran, 
which is more constrained than North Korea in China, can still obtain dual-use goods and 
raw materials from Chinese suppliers working through private Chinese companies that 
approach U.S. and European high technology subsidiaries with locations in China. 
Iran and North Korea have been purchasing a wide variety of goods for their gas 
centrifuge programs in China, but many of these high-tech goods are made in Europe, the 
U.S. and Japan. Actually, they are transshipped through China to either Iran or North 
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Korea. It is interesting to notice that many Chinese goods are not of the same high quality 
as those manufactured by developed countries. That is the reason why that Iran and North 
Korea prefer to import key vacuum pumps used in gas centrifuge programs, high quality 
carbon fiber, and pressure transducers from Western countries
250
. 
It is also clear that Iran and North Korea are trying to benefit from lax export 
controls in other developing countries. If export controls are not effective in China, it is 
likely that the situation is even worse in developing countries that are not part in any 
effort to restrict the exports of dual-use items. Years ago the Malaysian firm Scomi 
Precision Engineering and the Turkish EKA electrical equipment company, for example, 
had a central role in producing centrifuge technology for the Libyan nuclear program. 
Turkey has adopted dual-use export controls but Malaysia remains outside both the 
Zangger Committee and the NSG. It would also be important to implement effective 




It is also likely that North Korea will continue to help Iran overcome some 
technical challenges, especially if it continues to develop its uranium enrichment program 
and builds devices using weapons-grade uranium. Apparently, Iranian scientists are 
invited as observers at every major North Korean nuclear or missile test. Furthermore, 
North Korea is utilizing centrifuges based on the Pakistani P-2 design, which is the basis 
for Iran`s recently installed IR-2m centrifuges.  
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The uneven implementation of sanctions by developing countries - and permanent 
UN Security Council members such as Russia and China - is clearly undermining the 
effectiveness of coercive diplomacy. The spread of nuclear weapons technology is a trend 
that will probably continue in the near future. Thus, it is likely that more developing 
countries with lax export controls will have access to sensitive nuclear technology. 
Moreover, the failure of sanctions might legitimate the use of military force by Israel 
against Iran, a country that might take over the central role of “rogue supplier, ” due to its 




Illicit nuclear trade might be outside the scope of the NPT but the absence of 
effective export controls undermines the nonproliferation regime and creates the perfect 
environment for nuclear proliferation networks and VNPs. As nuclear cooperation 
increases, it is likely that more countries  will try to illegally acquire goods for their 
nuclear programs in the black market. After all, nuclear trade is a highly regulated 
business and  “rogue suppliers” will always exist to supply the demand for sensitive 
nuclear technology. In this sense, it is not reasonable to believe that illicit networks can 
be defeated completely, but they can certainly be controled. By the way, it is important to 
highlight the fact that all states party to the nonproliferation treaty are obliged, pursuant 
to article III, to implement export controls.  As mentioned previously, this obligation was 
reinforced by UNSCR 1540, which requires all states to implement export controls to 
prevent the spread of WMD.  
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Finally, the participation in the development and implementation of export 
controls should be broadened and multilaterally agreed export controls should be 
developed in a transparent manner, engaging all states. In this regard, second-tier states 
could learn from the expertise of first-tier states. After all, export controls coupled with 
the universal implementation of IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol are the 
most effective defense against the perils of illicit nuclear trade and would reinforce the 
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